Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case by Green, Michael D.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 30 
Issues 2&3 
1997 
Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest 
Case 
Michael D. Green 
University of Iowa College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 461 (1997). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol30/iss2/12 
 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
STATUTORY COMPLIANCE AND TORT LIABILITY:
EXAMINING THE STRONGEST CASEt
Michael D. Green*
Professor Green addresses the matter of the proper balance between
the tort system and regulation in the context of prescription drugs
and the FDA's vigorous oversight of the industry. He articulates
several reasons why a regulatory compliance defense, in which tort
law would defer to FDA regulation, is quite attractive. Despite the
superior expertise of the FDA in assessing the benefits and risks of
a drug, a regulatory compliance defense is considerably more
problematical than might appear at first glance. Ascertaining
compliance with FDA requirements could be a lengthy and compli-
cated inquiry that would either replace or supplement the issues
that arise in current drug product liability litigation. Particularly
in the period after a drug is approved and marketed, yet when
additional risks emerge, a regulatory compliance defense might
impede efforts to assure that current information is promptly
disseminated to physicians who make prescribing decisions.
Professor Green concludes by suggesting that a regulatory com-
pliance defense may have an impact on the types of drug litigation
that occur, but expresses doubt that drug litigation would
disappear.
The broad issue the Symposium session on government com-
pliance addresses is the overlap-perhaps conflict-between
safety regulation and tort law. Both are concerned with the
control of accidental risk and the attempt to find some reason-
able balance between accidental harm and human activity.'
Section 7(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
t © 1996 Michael D. Green, all rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. B.S. 1972, Tufts Univer-
sity; J.D. 1975, University of Pennsylvania Law School. My thanks to Steven Garber
and Lars Noah for their comments and suggestions about a draft of this Article, to
Richard Merrill for sharing his thoughts with me about this subject, and to Sarah
Livingston and Russ Markhovsky for their superb research assistance.
1. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357, 357 (1984) (discussing the behavioral incentives created by both
tort liability and government regulation). Of course, the tort system also serves a
compensatory function that regulation does not. A national health care system might
take some of the wind out of the compensatory sails of the tort ship, especially in the
context of pharmaceutical iatrogenic injury (accidental harm resulting from medical
treatment). For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of tort and regula-
tion in providing appropriate incentives for safety, see 2 AMERICAN LAW INST.,
REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 85-89 (1991).
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Liability reflects hornbook tort law: Compliance with a safety
statute is relevant and admissible with regard to whether the
defendant met the applicable tort standard of care, but not
dispositive.2 Asymmetrically, failure to comply with a safety
standard is a per se violation of the standard of care imposed
by tort law.3
The explanation for this contrasting treatment is that safety
standards prescribe only minimum standards. Rather than
defining the appropriate level of care, governmental standards
merely provide a floor of safety below which no one subject to
that standard should descend.4 If that characterization of
safety statutes and regulation is correct, then the hornbook
rule5 and the Restatement (Third) are on quite solid ground.'
This Article examines the strongest case for accepting
regulatory standards as conclusive of liability for tort law
purposes. The toughest challenge to section 7 and its provision
that compliance with a safety statute is merely a matter for the
finder of fact and is not legally dispositive is the pharmaceuti-
cal arena,7 which is regulated extensively by the U.S. Food and
2. Comment e to section 7 suggests that in some specific instances compliance
with a governmental safety standard might be treated as legally conclusive in a tort
action. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
3. See id. § 7(a). This rule, however, is subject to the possibility of excuse or
justification for the violation. See Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 990-91 (N.Y. 1939)
(holding that violation of a safety statute may be excused when circumstances are
such that the safer course of action is to not comply with statutory requirement);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 288A, 288B (1965) (providing excuses for
violation of a statute or regulation that, when present, prevent the violation from
constituting negligence per se).
4. See Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE 291, 306 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
5. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 36, at 233 (5th ed. 1984).
6. But see Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as
the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 964-67 (1996)
(suggesting that the "floor but not ceiling" explanation is antiquated and does not
reflect the vigor, comprehensiveness, and optimality of contemporary safety regula-
tion).
7. I limit my consideration to prescription drugs and do not consider medical
devices because courts have found tort liability of medical device manufacturers
preempted by the federal regulatory scheme, although the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996), has overturned those
decisions preempting claims involving medical devices that have not undergone
premarketing approval by the FDA. Federal preemption, as the Restatement (Third)
explains, is not a matter of tort law, but rather derives from the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 1, in this case implemented by
Congress' decision to make its legislative pronouncements the sole legal authority
applicable to a given regulatory situation. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2,
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Drug Administration (the FDA).'
There are several reasons for scrutinizing prescription drugs
and the FDA. First, the prescription drug industry is the most
heavily regulated industry (for safety purposes) in this country
today.9 The United States leads other Western countries in its
vigilance in protecting its citizenry from the risks of prescrip-
tion drugs; 10 indeed, the FDA has been criticized severely for
its overprotectiveness of the populace." Unlike many other
§ 7 cmt. e (discussing differences between state and federal preemption). For
discussions of federal preemption in the area of FDA-regulated medical devices, see
Brian J. Donato & Mary Beth Neraas, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims
Involving Drugs and Medical Devices Regulated Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 305 (1993); Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal
Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183 (1994).
The considerations relevant to preemption as compared to those relevant to a
statutory compliance defense are quite different, as the medical device preemption
cases illustrate. Prior to Lohr, some courts held that medical devices approved by the
FDA, but without any premarketing FDA review, were protected from state tort
liability by preemption. See cases cited infra note 112. These medical devices were
exempt from premarketing review pursuant to section 510(k) because they were
"substantially equivalent" to medical devices on the market before the FDA was
authorized to regulate medical devices in 1976. Although as a matter of preemption
law that may or may not have been a correct interpretation of Congress' intent, it
surely would be poor tort law to provide a statutory compliance defense for a product
that effectively has undergone no regulatory review for safety. For an explanation of
how preemption of state tort claims might be understood as a federal common law rule
providing a defense for compliance with governmental safety standards, see Noah,
supra note 6, at 971-78.
8. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 27-33 (1993) (describing the extent of FDA
regulation of pharmaceuticals).
9. The former director of the FDA's Bureau of Drugs observed, "Drugs and
medical devices are today the most heavily regulated consumer product in our society."
J. Richard Crout, The Drug Regulatory System: Reflections and Predictions, 36 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 106, 113 (1981).
10. One measure of commitment to safety is investigative thoroughness as
measured by length of time spent; the FDA's vigilance by this measure is well
documented. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN., REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S
PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS 25-30 (1980) (describing delays in the approval
of new drugs in the United States compared to other countries); WILLIAM M. WARDELL
& LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 55-78 (1975) (finding that
new drugs were approved more quickly in Great Britain); William M. Wardell,
Introduction of New Therapeutic Drugs in the United States and Great Britain: An
International Comparison, 14 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 773 (1973)
(finding that, in general, new drugs were approved more rapidly by drug regulators
in Great Britain than in the United States).
11. The criticism began in the early 1970s when Sam Peltzman published his
pioneering work that identified the "drug lag"-delay in the approval of
pharmaceuticals by the FDA compared to other Western countries and the consequent
cost to U.S. patients because of the delayed availability of new drugs. See Sam
Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug
463
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regulatory contexts, the FDA extensively regulates drugs from
cradle to grave, and it is difficult to identify areas of potential
risk reduction that the FDA does not address in its regula-
tions. 2 Indeed, as explained below, the vast majority of prod-
ucts liability litigation concerns the provision of warnings and
information about safe use of drugs, a major area of FDA
regulation. In short, pharmaceuticals present the toughest
challenge to the black letter provision of section 7 of the
Restatement (Third), and they are the strongest case for
accepting governmental safety standards as conclusive when
an injured plaintiff sues a pharmaceutical manufacturer for
iatrogenic injuries allegedly caused by a pharmaceutical.
Second, the matter of a statutory compliance defense for the
pharmaceutical industry comprises quite a prominent aspect
of contemporary tort reform legislation. Partially as a conse-
quence of the vigor of FDA regulation and partially as a
consequence of the perceived socially detrimental effects of the
present system of products liability law and its application to
prescription drugs, there has been a great deal of contemporary
activity and interest in changing the effect of FDA approval or
compliance in products liability litigation. Several states have
enacted statutes providing, 3 a number of commentators have
Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973). Throughout the remainder of the 1970s,
the drug lag was the subject of extensive commentary and criticism. See BARUCH A.
BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRUG TESTING, APPROVAL, AND PRICING: THE CLOT-
DISSOLVING DRUGS 164-65 (1995) (generally describing two critiques of the FDA: one
by Peltzman, who analyzed the economic effects of the 1962 FDA legislation and
another by William Wardell, who analyzed the clinical costs and benefits of the drug
lag in the United States).
12. See Beth E. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration's Experimental Drug
Approval System: Is It Good for Your Health?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 310-25 (1991)
(describing in detail the FDA's approval process and the breadth of the FDA's
regulatory scope).
13. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West Supp. 1995) (providing
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer is not liable for a drug approved by FDA, subject
to exceptions for fraud on or bribery of FDA); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987)
(creating a rebuttable presumption that a warning approved by the FDA is adequate);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (Anderson 1995) (barring punitive damages
against manufacturer of drug manufactured and labeled in compliance with FDA
requirements); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (1995) (barring punitive damages in a
pharmaceutical case in which drug and labeling was approved by FDA, provided
material information was not withheld or misrepresented); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2
(1992) (prohibiting the award of punitive damages if the drug causing the claimant's
harm received premarketing approval or licensure by the FDA, unless it is shown by
clear and convincing evidence that the drug manufacturer knowingly withheld or
misrepresented material and relevant information); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz,
Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1341 n.37 (1993)
(citing statutes that create a presumption of non-liability when statutory compliance
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advocated, 4 and Congress has considered seriously 5 special
treatment of pharmaceuticals and other products regulated by
the FDA. The basic thrust of this legislative reform would be
to insulate manufacturers of pharmaceuticals approved by the
FDA or manufacturers who comply with applicable FDA
regulations from tort liability, or, alternatively, from liability
for punitive damages.
Third, the Restatement (Third) itself leaves open a small
window for a stronger role for compliance with governmental
safety regulation. Comment e to section 7 suggests that com-
mon law courts might decide that a safety statute or regulation
is sufficiently current, protective, salient, and the product of
untainted regulatory expertise to treat the safety standard as
existed); Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 178 (1989) (detailing state statutes that provide a rebuttable
presumption that a product is not defective if in compliance with relevant safety
standards).
14. See GARBER, supra note 8, at 192-93; AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1, at
83-110; Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the
Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 233, 233-34 (1986); Charles
J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law
Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 171, 183-84 & nn.59-60 (1986); Note, A
Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103
HARV. L. REV. 773 passim (1990); see also Robert F. Service, Panel Wants to Break
R&D Barrier, 272 Sci. 1258, 1258 (1996) (reporting on Institute of Medicine recom-
mendation that companies who obtain FDA approval for a new contraceptive be
insulated from product liability); Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical
Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L.' REv. 199, 235-36 (1992) (recommending
replacement of tort law for pharmaceutical injuries with a no-fault compensation
scheme).
The pharmaceutical industry itself, as one might expect, has been quite active in
lobbying on a variety of fronts for greater deference by the tort system to FDA
regulatory determinations. See, e.g., Comments of Eli Lilly and Company on the
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Products Liability, Preliminary Draft No.
1, at 12 (Aug. 9, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
("A jury should not be allowed to remake the FDA's decision.").
15. Several versions of the Common Sense Products Liability and Legal Reform
Bill of 1995 contained a provision that would have precluded the awarding of punitive
damages against a manufacturer or product seller of a drug that was subject to
premarket approval by the FDA with respect to the safety of the formulation or
performance aspect of the drug and was approved by the FDA. See H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. § 201(F)(1)(A) (1995) (Versions 4, 5, 6, and 7). If the manufacturer or product
seller of a drug intentionally withheld from or misrepresented to the FDA information
that is material and relevant to the claimant, the provision precluding punitive
damages would not apply. Id. § 201(F)(1)(B). This provision was removed from the
succeeding versions of the bill. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995) (Versions 8, 9, and
10). The most recent appearance of this provision was in H.R. 2425, 104th Cong.
§ 15312(e)(a)(A)-(B) (1995).
Statutory Compliance
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conclusive in a products liability suit.'" Thus, the Restatement
(Third) recognizes both that all safety statutes and regulations
are not alike and that some are more deserving of respect in
tort suits than others, thereby suggesting that common law
courts consider adopting a more powerful role for those safety
standards that are sufficiently rigorous.
The recognition that adopting a statutory compliance defense
requires consideration of the specific standard or regulatory
scheme is quite sound. The variety of industries and risks that
are regulated, the variety of means employed to regulate risks,
the strengths and weaknesses of those different regulatory
schemes, the seriousness and intrusiveness of the regulatory
scheme, and the resources available to the regulatory agency
have important implications in considering the proper role for
other regulatory rules in tort suits.'" Thus, this Article opts to
address a single regulatory scheme, albeit the one for which
the strongest case might be made for a compliance defense.
Finally, by addressing the most pervasive regulatory si-
tuation, we should be able to learn much about whether and
when the tort system should defer to a greater extent to
regulation. To the extent that a governmental compliance
defense is problematic even in the strongest case-as this
Article argues-then, a fortiori, the case for a broader umbrella
for a government standards defense is weaker.
Let us begin by considering what can be said in favor of
adopting a regulatory compliance defense for products liability
claims that arise from prescription drugs. The predominant
argument is that the overlap of regulation and tort law results
16. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 7 cmt. e. The taint concern is that
an industry may "capture" the regulatory agency, which then acts to benefit the
industry, rather than consumers or overall social welfare. For one of the early
accounts of the life cycle of an agency progressing to the stage of industry capture,
see MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
74-95 (1955). The regulatory-capture theory of agency action has been quite popular
since the 1970s. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (arguing that regulations are initiated, constructed, and
implemented for the benefit of the regulated industry).
17. See generally CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING ToxIc SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSO-
PHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAw 104-08 (1993) (discussing the large number of
regulatory statutes and agencies concerned with carcinogenic agents); Noah, supra
note 6, at 977 n.285 (citing support for the proposition that products regulated by the
FDA most deserve the protections of a government standards defense); W. Kip Viscusi
et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the
FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1475-79 (1994)
(arguing for national standards in pharmaceutical litigation because of the distinct
issues peculiar to the industry).
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in overdeterrence, which in the drug context has several
undesirable aspects:
(1) Manufacturers are deterred from research and develop-
ment of new and effective drugs, the benefits of which are lost
to society;'
8
(2) Manufacturers who do develop new drugs will test them
longer and more carefully, thereby delaying the availability of
the drug and its therapeutic advantages to society; 19
(3) Beneficial drugs are withdrawn from the market;2"
(4) Shortages in supplies and suppliers of pharmaceuticals
will occur, as has been most notable in the vaccine area;21
(5) Dual systems overlap, which results in duplicated ad-
ministrative costs; unnecessary administrative costs are a
concern especially in light of the substantial administrative
costs of the tort system.22
The premises for the overdeterrence argument are that (1)
the FDA provides optimal levels of safety precautions, rather
than a floor or minimum standard; (2) the FDA is more accu-
rate than a court or jury at identifying the appropriate level
of safety precaution;23 and (3) where activities are subject to
regulation, retention of tort liability systematically will impose
18. See, e.g., Punitive Damages: Tort Reform and FDA Defenses: Hearings on S.
671 and S. 672 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 141-42 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum).
19. See Walsh & Klein, supra note 14, at 194.
20. See S. REP. No. 102-215, at 38 (1991); GARBER, supra note 8, at 82-86;
WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 164(1991); C.I. Barash & Louis Lasagna,
The Bendectin Saga: "Voluntary" Discontinuation, 1 J. CLINICAL RES. & DRUG DEV.
277, 289 (1987); Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufac-
turers for Failure to Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits
from Driving Good Drugs Offthe Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413,415 (1989-90);
Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive
Damage Awards on Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 693, 700-01 (1990).
21. See INSTITUTE OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 27-44 (1985);
Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third),
61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1401-02 (1994).
22. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1, at 89.
23. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 329-35 (1985); W. Kip Viscusi &
Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship between Product Liability and
Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 125 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991);
Walsh & Klein, supra note 14, at 193. Complementing this argument is that, if
anything, the FDA is overly conservative about approving new drugs. Thus, FDA
regulation alone is biased and results in excessive caution at the cost of greater
therapeutic benefits. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Product Liability in Pharmaceuticals:
Comments on Chapters Eight and Nine, in THE LIABILITY MAZE 360, 364 (Peter W.
Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
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excessive liability and litigation costs on the regulated indus-
try.24 Often the excess cost problem is not the result of adverse
judgments, but a result of litigation costs.25 In the Bendectin
litigation, for example, Marion Merrell Dow, the manufacturer,
has not yet suffered an adverse final judgment, yet it has
incurred an estimated $100 million bill in defending itself in
the litigation.26
This Article proceeds first by providing background with a
summary of the provisions of the Restatement (Third) relating
to pharmaceutical products liability cases and identifying the
significant substantive issues likely to arise in conventional
pharmaceutical products cases. The Article next examines the
case for a government standards defense.
The Article agrees with the proponents of an FDA approval
defense that the FDA provides optimal standards for pharma-
ceutical approval and that FDA expertise should receive
deference. FDA approval of a new pharmaceutical is based on
a determination that the social benefits of the drug outweigh
24. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 1, at 87; Cooper, supra note 14, at 237.
In addition to these aspects of overdeterrence, the argument is sometimes made
that permitting a jury to find inadequate a drug warning that the FDA has approved
and mandated is unfair to the manufacturer. See Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d
1173, 1179-80 (5th Cir. 1988) (making this argument especially in light of FDA
restrictions on manufacturers' ability to add additional warnings); Margaret Gilhooley,
Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24
SETON HALL L. REv. 1481, 1485 (1994).
Conversely, the relatively low level of tort claims against the pharmaceutical
industry, when set against a backdrop of more than 2.2 billion prescriptions, 60,000
reported adverse drug reactions, and substantial number of deaths may be worthy
of note. See Swazey, supra note 4, at 326; see also Samuel Shapiro et al., Fatal Drug
Reactions Among Medical Inpatients, 216 JAMA 467 (1971) (finding that phar-
maceuticals administered to hospital patients were responsible for deaths of .44% of
patients). The Rand Institute has found that between 1974 and 1986, there were, on
average, fewer than 200 pharmaceutical lawsuits filed per year in the federal courts,
exclusive ofBendectin and Dalkon Shield suits. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURT 40
(1988). Another study found a similar incidence of pharmaceutical lawsuits in federal
courts. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., A Statistical Profile of Pharmaceutical Industry
Liability, 1976-1989, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1418, 1420-22 (1994). A General
Accounting Office study of verdicts in products liability cases in five states found that
approximately 50% were litigated in state court and 50% in federal court, which would
suggest that the total number of pharmaceutical products cases is 400 per year,
exclusive of mass litigations. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-99,
PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FrvE STATES 20-21 (1989).
25. See GARBER, supra note 8, at 93.
26. See Punitive Damages: Tort Reform and FDA Defenses: Hearings on S. 671
and S. 672 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 141-42 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND
BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOxIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 335 (1996).
WINTER AND SPRING 19971
its risks. Thus, FDA review of drugs cannot be characterized
as setting a minimum, as opposed to an optimal standard.
Second, the FDA's judgments on New Drug Applications
(NDAs) are about as good as any human system can produce
in terms of assessing risks and comparing them with therapeu-
tic benefits-certainly better than the common law courts can
provide, at least to the extent accuracy is the goal.2"
Notwithstanding the superior expertise and optimal stan-
dards (at least with regard to safety concerns)29 of the FDA, a
government compliance defense is far more problematic than
most of the contemporary proponents of such a reform have
recognized. The third Part of this Article explains that any
such defense would have to be limited to those instances in
which the manufacturer complied with all relevant statutory
and regulatory requirements both pre-approval and post-
approval. Once statutory and regulatory compliance become the
standard for a defense, the difficulties of such a defense begin
to emerge.
Part Four explains why any compliance defense would be
likely to shift the focus of pharmaceutical tort litigation rather
than to prevent it. Indeed, the inquiry into compliance issues
may be no more appropriate for common law courts than the
issues confronting the courts in contemporary pharmaceutical
litigation. In short, a compliance defense does not hold much
promise for reducing transaction costs; instead, it may exacer-
bate them by adding an additional layer of litigation filled with
peripheral issues for meritorious cases.
The final section of the Article expresses concern about the
adequacy of FDA resources to oversee the industry in the post-
approval period when additional risks are identified. Removing
the incentives provided by the tort system for prompt warnings
of newly emergent risks and limitations on efficacy may have
an unfortunate impact on prompt dissemination of this infor-
27. See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA.
L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1973).
28. Some argue that accuracy should not be exalted as the single or primary goal
of adjudicatory processes. Thus, for one who believes grass roots democratic participa-
tion is central to the adjudicatory process,jury determinations in the litigation context
are preferable to the FDA, despite the latter's expertise and more accurate
decisionmaking. Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1377-92 (1985) (arguing that
public acceptance and the projection of public norms is as important a goal for an
adjudicative system as accuracy).
29. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
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mation. Finally, attempting to compromise (or create a more
focused reform) by making the defense only applicable to
punitive damages (as a number or state statutes have done)
may, perversely, exacerbate the problems of employing a
government standards defense.
I. PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
Before proceeding to consider how a government compliance
defense would operate, we should recognize the special charac-
ter of pharmaceutical products liability litigation. With the
advent of the Restatement (Third), we can skip past the confu-
sion engendered by section 402A comment k of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,3 ° and consider the application of the function-
al approach to drug litigation wisely adopted by the Reporters
and the special design standards for pharmaceutical litigation.
In the mix of pharmaceutical products liability litigation,
manufacturing defects are infrequent31 and quite uncontro-
versial.32 The FDA prescribes good manufacturing practices
that, along with technological capabilities of the industry,
result in the sale of very few dangerously adulterated drugs.
The Restatement (Third) imposes strict liability for manufactur-
ing defects, and comment a to section 7 explains why compli-
ance with safety standards regarding the manufacturing
process should not insulate the manufacturer from strict
30. The core difficulty is that comment k provides more limited liability standards
for manufacturers of "unavoidably unsafe" products, and the courts have struggled
with which products this encompasses. See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe
Products and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to
Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 712-19 (1989-90) (claiming that
the "unavoidably unsafe" designation generally has been limited to "chemical drugs,
antibiotics, vaccines, blood or medical devices," but that courts have disagreed over
which products within these categories should be so designated); Joseph A. Page,
Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 (1983) (discussing the problems in interpreting comment k).
Compare Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374,380 (N.J. 1984) (drugs are generally
subject to strict products liability; some drugs, determined on a case-by-case basis,
may be afforded comment k protection), with Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470,
481-82 (Cal. 1988) (no strict products liability available for design defect claims
involving pharmaceuticals).
31. See Swazey, supra note 4, at 305.
32. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1369.
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liability for manufacturing defects.3 3 Section 8(b)(1) of the
Restatement (Third) extends strict liability for manufacturing
defects to pharmaceuticals.34
The analysis for design defects in drugs is quite different and
driven by the unique character of most drugs. Unlike durable
goods, drugs cannot be designed in an alternative fashion, at
least not in light of current technological capabilities.35 With
the Restatement (Third)'s adoption of a risk-benefit test for
design defects and its insistence on proof of an alternative
design, one might think that there would therefore be no place
for a design defect theory involving pharmaceuticals.36
But the Restatement (Third) does have a very limited pro-
vision for a design defect claim in the case of pharmaceuticals:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably
safe due to defective design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently
great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits so
that no reasonable health care provider, knowing of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would prescribe
the drug or medical device for any class of patients.37
In failing to demand proof of a reasonable alternative design
as is mandated for other product design claims,38 the Restate-
ment (Third) might be understood to recognize the way in
which drugs (and other chemicals) differ from durable goods
33. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 7 cmt. a (stating that statutes or
regulations relating to manufacturing defects usually address quality control levels,
and quality control levels are irrelevant because liability for manufacturing defects
is liability without fault).
34. See id. § 8(b)(1) (incorporating the general standards for liability for a
manufacturing defect contained in section 2(a)). Thus, if a drug is contaminated,
adulterated, or otherwise not in conformity with the drug's specifications, the
manufacturer will be strictly liable for any harm caused by the flaw. See id.
35. But see infra note 53.
36. This observation is inapplicable to medical devices. Pharmaceuticals differ
from most products because it is difficult to change the design of a given drug; medical
devices, such as the Dalkon Shield with a multifilament tailstring, although subject
to FDA regulation, do not share that characteristic with drugs.
37. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 8(c).
38. See id. § 2(b). A narrow exception disregards the requirement of a reasonable
alternative design when the "extremely high degree of danger posed by [the product's]
use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible utility that no rational
adult, fully aware of the relevant facts would choose to use or consume the product."
Id. § 2(b) cmt. d; see also id. § 2(b) cmt. d, illus. 5 (describing an exploding cigar as
an example of such a product).
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in their amenability to design change. The inclusion of medical
devices in section 8(c) contradicts this explanation for the
different treatment of pharmaceuticals, however, as most
medical devices are more like durable goods than drugs in their
amenability to design modification. Rather, the limited design
claim provided in section 8(c) reveals two principles that are
in tension.
First, design defect claims are permitted without proof of an
alternative design, thereby permitting courts and juries to do
for pharmaceuticals what the Restatement (Third) does not
permit for durable goods-to make an overall risk-benefit
judgment for the drug or medical device, and, if the risks
inherent in the pharmaceutical outweigh its benefits to pa-
tients, to declare the pharmaceutical defective. This expansion
of design defect liability for pharmaceuticals as compared to
durable goods reflects a number of courts that have permitted,
in limited fashion, a design defect claim to be made for pre-
scription drugs.39 At the same time, the expansion is quite
limited, permitting a finding of defect only in a limited range
of circumstances.4" Comment f reveals that the goal of the
Restatement (Third) is to maximize the availability of
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, provided that adequate
warnings accompany them.41 Unstated but nevertheless promi-
nent in the close confinement of the design claim is reliance on
the FDA and its screening of new drugs and medical devices
to ensure that their benefits outweigh the risks.42 Thus, we see
that the efficacy of FDA regulation affects the substantive
standards for drug liability as well as the question of a regula-
tory defense.
Nevertheless, we should expect that design claims in phar-
maceutical litigation will be relatively rare. 43 The vast bulk of
pharmaceutical litigation is in the warnings area and that will
39. See id. § 8 reporters' note cmt. f (stating that the recent trend has been
toward greater judicial review in this area).
40. See id. § 8.
41. See id. § 8 cmt. f (stating that "as long as a given drug provides or device
provides net benefits for some category of patients, it should be available to that
group, albeit with appropriate warnings and instructions").
42. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter's Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
471, 473-74 (1996).
43. See GARBER, supra note 8, at 39-40 (noting that it "seems rare for design
defects to be found"); Henderson, supra note 42, at 492 (positing that the Restatement
(Third) "reflects the view that courts are institutionally unequipped to substitute their
approval of a proposed new drug, on a case-by-case basis, for that of the FDA").
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continue for the foreseeable future.4 The predominant claim
in most warnings cases concerns risks that emerged after the
drugs were approved by the FDA and made available to the
public.4 5 In the warnings litigation arena, the major issues that
arise include: (1) whether the drug causes an adverse reaction
or disease from which the plaintiff suffers;46 (2) where adverse
reactions or diseases are shown to exist, whether the manufac-
turer had adequate knowledge of the dangers to have a duty
to warn;47 and (3) the adequacy of any provided warnings. 4 The
primary liability issues that might be affected by a government
standards defense would be causation, and the adequacy,
accuracy, and timeliness of drug labeling providing information
about the risks entailed in use of a pharmaceutical.
II. THE CASE FOR AN FDA APPROVAL DEFENSE
There are three frequently raised objections to a government
standards defense: (1) governmental regulation is designed to
provide a minimum, rather than an optimal, level of safety; (2)
regulatory capture;4 9 and (3) government standards are often
outdated"° or do not exist for the specific risk of which the
plaintiff complains.5 ' In those situations the common law
system is better situated to decide whether the manufacturer
44. See GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE
RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 38 (1983) ("In the case of
pharmaceuticals, most suits involve warning labels.").
45. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration
Regulation and Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J.
194, 228 (1987) ("A review of... cases shows that the great majority of suits are
predicated on actions or omissions that took place after the drug or device entered the
market."). For an explanation of why post-marketing risks and warnings play such
a prominent role in pharmaceutical products liability litigation, see infra text
accompanying notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir.
1990).
47. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388-89 (N.J. 1984); McEwen
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974).
48. See, e.g., McEwen, 528 P.2d at 536; Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89,
92 (Utah 1991).
49. See sources cited supra note 16.
50. See, e.g., Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in
Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1151-52 (1988) (explaining that
obsolescence can occur through changes in technology, inadequate resources of the
regulating agency, and the general slowness of regulatory bodies).
51. See, e.g., id. at 1143.
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has met appropriate standards with regard to safety. At least
with regard to the FDA's decision to approve a new pharmaceu-
tical, I do not believe that any of these objections to a regulato-
ry compliance defense have much force.
When the FDA approves a new drug, it is not providing
safety minima. What the FDA does when it approves a drug
is determine that because the drug's efficacy sufficiently
outweighs its risks of adverse reactions, it should be available
for patients, albeit with appropriate warnings of those adverse
reactions.52 Because the unique constitution of drugs does not
allow the possibility of building in marginal additional safety
through design changes, all we can ask in terms of safety is
that the benefit/risk relationship is positive, that adequate
testing is conducted to identify risks, and that available
information about known risks is provided. Unlike durable
goods, pharmaceuticals cannot be designed differently, in the
sense of modifying (or adding to) the product so as to build in
more safety.53 We simply do not know how to rearrange the
electrons or move the relative position of, say, the carbon and
hydrogen molecules so as to squeeze out the drug's tendency
52. See Merrill, supra note 27, at 9-10; see also Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97
(finding the FDA's "extensive regulatory scheme capable of and appropriate for
making the preliminary determination regarding whether a prescription drug's
benefits outweigh its risks").
53. A couple of exceptions exist. Combination drugs contain multiple active
ingredients and can be designed differently by removing or adding active ingredients.
For example, Fiorinal, a prescription drug for headaches, originally contained a
barbiturate, aspirin, caffeine, and phenacetin (an analgesic). In 1981, phenacetin was
removed from the market because of safety concerns, and Fiorinal was redesigned
without the phenacetin component. See Aspirin IAcetaminophen Combination Poses
Safety Question at FDA, FOOD & DRUG LETTER (Washington Bus. Info., Inc.), May 22,
1981, at 3 (reporting that phenacetin was about to be banned from marketed drugs);
see also Combinational Chemistry Hits the Drug Market, 272 Scd. 1266 (1996) (describ-
ing recent scientific developments that permit the manipulation of organic molecules
to create many chemically similar substances that can be tested for potential in
treating diseases). The second exception concerns the recommended dosage; experience
with a drug may reveal that the same therapeutic benefits can be obtained with a
lower dose, and decreasing the dose reduces the risk of adverse side effects. See, e.g.,
Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652,658-59 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding ajury
finding that warnings were inadequate because they did not mention a correlation
between dosage level and risk of adverse reaction); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
REPORT OF THE HALCION TASK FORCE 14 (1996) [hereinafter HALCION TASK FORCE
REPORT] (noting that the recommended dosage for Halcion was reduced in response
to adverse reactions); GARBER, supra note 8, at 24-25 (describing the process of
redesigning drugs with more chemical particularity to minimize side effects); Improved
Safety with Low-Estrogen Oral Contraceptives, FDA MED. BULL., May 1994, at 3-4
(finding that low-dose oral contraceptive users had a lower risk of thromboembolism
than higher-dose oral contraceptive users).
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to cause nausea or cell mutation, while retaining its beneficial
physiological effects. Thus, the regulatory overseer cannot, as
with an automobile or industrial machine, specify certain
minimum standards for safety design (e.g., driver-side airbag;
point-of-operation guards) that might be characterized as a
safety floor. Rather, with nonmodifiable drugs, the FDA must
decide whether the therapeutic benefits of a new pharmaceuti-
cal outweigh the risks it poses through adverse side effects. In
these cases, a regulatory approval defense is most attractive:
the FDA has made a risk-benefit analysis of the drug, which
is precisely the issue that will arise in a products liability
design defect claim. If one accepts the proposition that the FDA
is more accurate than courts in making such determinations,
as argued below,54 a regulatory compliance defense for design
defect claims for drugs approved by the FDA appears justified.
Consistent with the above, one might think that the FDA
should not approve a new drug whose efficacy-safety balance
is less favorable than another drug available to treat the same
condition.55 Efficacy-safety ratios, however, emerge from
clinical (epidemiological) studies that examine the benefits and
adverse reactions among groups of patients. But there is much
variability among individuals, and a drug that better treats one
individual may not work similarly for another. Thus, even
drugs that emerge in epidemiological studies as less beneficial
than their competitors for the group studied may be more
beneficial for some individual patients. Physicians, exercising
good prescribing practices, will try initially the most beneficial
drug. If it is not effective or if the patient cannot tolerate its
side effects, then the physician will prescribe an alternative
drug that may not have fared as well overall in epidemiological
studies, but which may turn out to be better for that specific
patient. At bottom, the issue is the provision of adequate
information to physicians making the prescription deci-
sion-revealing the overall efficacy-safety balance of a drug
and identifying any known individual factors that make a drug
54. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
55. The pharmaceutical industry managed to block inclusion of inter-drug efficacy
comparisons in the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The FDA,
however, has asserted the right to disapprove an NDA based on comparative safety.
See, e.g., John C. Ballin, Who Makes the Therapeutic Decisions?, 242 JAMA 2875, 2875
(1979) (criticizing the FDA for attempting to limit the availability of drugs to those
that are safest).
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more or less efficacious or safe for certain patients. The FDA
has the authority to require a drug's label to provide this
information.56
If a new drug passes the risk-benefit screening test, the drug
labeling then seeks to minimize potential adverse effects
through explanations of contraindications and precautions for
those taking the drug. Individual autonomy is fostered by
warning of the side effects that cannot be avoided or mini-
mized. Because information about both the benefits and risks
of pharmaceuticals is so costly to obtain, pharmaceuticals have
been regulated since 1906 and today are extensively regulated
not only for information-enhancing purposes (ensuring that a
drug's labeling is accurate and complete) but also for pure
consumer protection (keeping unsafe drugs off the market).57
Pharmaceutical regulation entails premarketing approval;
before a prescription drug may be marketed, regulatory ap-
proval is required. This means that we have, ex ante, the
regulatory agency's assessment and approval of the drug, the
IND testing, and the labeling provided with the drug. Post-
marketing regulation, in which compliance is not determined
unless and until someone raises the issue of noncompliance, is
a much more uncertain environment for use of a government
compliance defense.
Premarketing approval also provides the FDA with a strate-
gy for dealing with the perennial problem of inadequate
regulatory resources for enforcement. The FDA is woefully
underfunded for its mandate, which includes regulatory over-
sight of products that account for more than twenty-five
percent of all American consumer purchases. 58 A 1991 study
of the FDA reported, "It is glaringly apparent that the FDA
cannot now execute all of its statutory responsibilities within
the limitations of existing resources, a conclusion that is
repeated throughout this report."59 The budget for the entire
56. 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56-201.57, 201.100 (1996).
57. See Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 91, 103-04 (1979).
58. See John K Iglehart, The Food and Drug Administration and Its Problems,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 217, 217 (1991).
59. ADVISORY COMM. ON FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FINAL REPORT 11 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]; cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240,
2246-48 (1996) (stating that inadequate resources of the FDA to review applications
for approval of new medical devices has resulted in many medical devices being
submitted to FDA under a premarketing notification provision for devices "substantial-
ly equivalent" to those marketed before the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976).
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human drug division of the FDA totalled a mere $272 million
in 1996.60 Premarketing approval means that the effects of
inadequate regulatory resources can be managed without
compromising safety concerns-consideration of an application
for approval of a new drug can be deferred and approval
delayed. This strategy may have adverse consequences for
those patients for whom the drug will be therapeutically
beneficial, 61 but the trade-off is to protect against adverse drug
effects.
Finally, it seems plain that the FDA, with its expertise, can
reach more accurate decisions than can a common law jury.
Even the most vociferous critics of a regulatory compliance
defense do not argue otherwise.62 The experience with the
Bendectin litigation-in which plaintiffs, over a fifteen-year
period, obtained favorable jury verdicts in about forty percent
of cases tried before juries despite a strong consensus in the
medical, scientific, and FDA communities that Bendectin is not
a teratogen-is one striking and popular bit of evidence sup-
porting this proposition.63
Thus, if we could freeze time at the point of FDA approval
of a new drug, a regulatory compliance defense might be
reasonable. I am inclined to think that the FDA's initial
approval of a drug and labeling requirements for that drug is
about as good as we can do. That is not to suggest that the
60. See FDA Talk Paper No. T96-17: 1997 Budget Proposed for FDA, Mar. 19,
1996, at 3, available in WL, Diogenes Database. The 1994 and 1995 budgets for the
human drug division were estimated at $242 million and $254 million, respectively.
See Hearings on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and DrugAdministration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Dev.,
Food and Drug Admin., and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
103d Cong. 217 (1994).
61. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
62. For example, one set of critics argues against a government compliance
defense because of concerns about the FDA's resources and ability to oversee the IND
testing process. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform:
Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 48 (1995). So long as any defense
requires compliance with FDA standards, however, any manufacturer who failed to
comply with IND requirements would not have the benefit of the defense. See
Schwartz, supra note 50, at 1127-35. "
63. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation
in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1993). If Bendectin is a teratogen,
it is such a weak one that despite extensive scientific study, existing scientific
methods are unable to detect it. With such a weak teratogen, no Bendectin plaintiff
should be able to succeed in proving that her birth defect was more likely than not
caused by Bendectin. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 328-29.
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FDA is perfect-surely it is not.64 Decisionmaking with
imperfect information in a scientifically complex arena that
requires balancing health benefits with the adverse effects that
are inevitable with physiologically active agents is not easy and
will result, with some frequency, in incorrect or dubious
outcomes.65 The question, however, is not perfection but the
best alternative. And in that respect, the FDA beats anything
else available.6
Most importantly, strong influences drive the FDA toward
being more cautious with regard to approval of new drugs.
Before the drug-lag criticism that began in the mid-1970s,67 the
FDA was subject to the harsh glare of public criticism when it
approved a drug that subsequently was revealed to have serious
hazards. 6' The media and Congress regularly denounced the
64. See Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 191, 203-07 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). Quirk asserts that FDA
decisionmaking is problematic for several reasons. The FDA must rely on manufactur-
er-sponsored studies and is inclined to approve drugs despite marginal deficiencies
in testing methods. The FDA's effectiveness in evaluating manufacturer's drug studies
is limited by its inability to attract high-caliber scientists and its poor management.
Animal testing and limited human testing may not identify the hazards of a new drug.
Further, after the FDA approves a drug, it lacks authority to continue monitoring the
drug. The FDA cannot monitor the way in which doctors prescribe the drug or whether
they misuse it. See id.
There is no shortage of critics who allege shortcomings in the FDA's regulatory
activities, ranging from a failure to take a leadership role in examining high drug
prices to the generic drug scandals of the 1980s. The vast majority of this criticism
of the FDA is unrelated to its role in assessing the safety of new drugs (at least when
it has full information). This criticism is often related to the lack of resources available
to the Agency in enforcing its mandate. See generally HERBERT BURKHOLZ, THE FDA
FOLLIES 4 & n. 1 (1994) (identifying the FDA's ineffective assessment of new drugs as
only one of several criticisms of the FDA; other criticisms are budget-based, including
a threadbare budget, an inability to accommodate an expanding AIDS drug market,
and improper or infrequent inspection of food and drug factories).
65. See Quirk, supra note 64, at 206 (explaining that the FDA's evaluation of
relative risks and benefits of a drug under consideration for approval is complicated
by the fact that "these benefits and risks are often subject to extreme uncertainty").
Of course, hindsight will show some decisions to have been unwise. By "incorrect" or
"dubious," I mean as judged according to the information (or absence of information)
available at the time of the FDA's decision.
66. See id. at 220-21 (discussing a study in which a consumer-oriented panel
studied FDA new drug approvals and, although reviewers disagreed with some FDA
judgments, disagreements revealed no bias on the FDA's part to prefer erroneously
approving NDAs (citing REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATIONS, INTERIM REPORT:
FDA'S REvEw OF INITIAL IND SUBMISSIONS: A STUDY OF THE PROCESS FOR RESOLVING
INTERNAL DIFFERENCES AND AN EVALUATION OF SCIENTIFIC JUDGMENTS (1977))).
67. See Crout, supra note 9, at 114.
68. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 132 (1982) (describing
economic and political pressures faced by FDA officials that cause them to overempha-
size safety regulation); Quirk, supra note 64, at 217-18 (describing the external
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FDA for errors of commission. By contrast, the failure to
approve (or delay in approving) a beneficial drug was not the
subject of public or congressional concern. Former FDA Com-
missioner Alexander Schmidt addressed the FDA's false
negative bias:
For example, in all of FDA's history, I am unable to find a
single instance where a Congressional committee investi-
gated the failure of the FDA to approve a new drug. But,
the times when hearings have been held to criticize our
approval of new drugs have been so frequent that we aren't
able to count them .... The message to FDA staff could not
be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug is
resolved by its approval, the Agency and the individuals
involved likely will be investigated. Whenever such a drug
is disapproved, no inquiry will be made. The Congressional
pressure for our negative action on new drug applications
is, therefore, intense. And it seems to be increasing as
everyone is becoming a self-acclaimed expert on carcinogens
and drug testing.
69
I do not want to be understood as claiming that the phar-
maceutical industry and its interests play no role in influencing
FDA decisionmaking. The industry is plainly better organized,
has more extensive contact with, and is far more able to affect
FDA decisionmaking than the handful of consumer protection
organizations, such as Public Citizen, that are involved in drug
pressures placed on the FDA in the approval of new drugs; cf GARBER, supra note 8,
at 32 (arguing that economic incentives cause the FDA to be overcautious when
approving new drugs).
69. Alexander Schmidt, The FDA Today: Critics, Congress, and Consumerism,
Address Before the National Press Club (Oct. 29, 1974), quoted in HENRY G.
GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING
THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 5 (1983). Grabowski and Vernon observe:
In point of fact, the institutional incentives confronting FDA officials strongly
reinforce the tendency to avoid type 2 errors [approving dangerous drugs] at the
expense of type 1 errors [failing to approve efficacious drugs]. An FDA official
who approves a drug subsequently shown to be not safe or effective stands to
bear heavy personal costs .... The costs of rejecting a good drug are borne by
outside parties (drug manufacturers and sick patients who might benefit from
it).
GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra, at 10.
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regulation.7" The FDA is made up of a large number of individ-
uals and some, no doubt, will have sympathies and interests
that align with industry interests. The political winds often
shift, depending on the current Administration, and those
winds often play a role in the regulatory teeth of federal
agencies. 7' Rather, the claim is that any pro-industry bias or
influence that may exist with regard to'the new drug approval
process in the FDA has been outweighed by countervailing risk
aversion born of concern about public and congressional
calumny in the event of the approval of a new drug that turns
out to be a successor to thalidomide. Frances Kelsey, the FDA
official who refused to approve thalidomide for sale in the
United States, was accorded hero status for her role in protect-
ing Americans from the horrific effects of that drug.72
In short, given the expertise of the FDA and the political
incentives that operate on it, a regulatory compliance defense
for drugs approved by the FDA appears promising. It would
lead to greater accuracy in the adjudication of tort cases and
might provide a measure of confidence to pharmaceutical
manufacturers that would generate a modestly more robust
new drug development process. But before we enact legislation
embodying such a reform, an important qualification and an
70. See JOHN ABRAHAM, SCIENCE, POLITICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
CONTROVERSY AND BIAS IN DRUG REGULATION 22-25 (1995) (distinguishing regulatory
capture from differing ability of various interest groups to organize and thereby
influence regulation); EADS & REUTER, supra note 44, at 37 (describing interactions
between regulators and officials of companies in the regulated industry that, while
short of regulatory capture, affect the regulatory process); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAU-
CRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 80-85 (1989)
(describing how different political contexts influence agency decisionmaking); Paul
Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate-and
Less Pessimistic-Theory of Clientele Capture, 6 POLY SCI. 301, 325-27 (1975) (arguing
that regulatory capture is not inevitable).
71. See SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH
TO DEREGULATE 39-43 (1983) (noting how the Reagan administration sought
deregulation immediately after the inauguration); Quirk, supra note 64, at 218
(stating that "the FDA's political environment allows for-and indeed probably
causes-noticeable fluctuation in the orientation of the agency over time"); ABRAHAM,
supra note 70, at 80.
72. See BURKHOLZ, supra note 64, at 109-10. After reviewing more than 100
congressional investigations of the FDA, the former chief counsel for the FDA wrote:
"No FDA official has ever been publicly criticized for refusing to allow the marketing
of a drug. Many, however, have paid the price of public criticism, sometimes accompa-
nied by an innuendo of corruptibility, for approving a product that could cause harm."
Richard A. Merrill, Can the FDA DoAnything Right?, VA. L. SCH. REP., Summer 1978,
at 19, 22, quoted in Sidney A. Shapiro, Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe a
Drug for any Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 813 n.86
(1978).
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explanation of why the reform may provide less than initially
meets the eye is necessary. The next section provides the
qualification; the remainder of this Article addresses the
explanation.
III. AN IMPORTANT (AND A CONTINGENT) QUALIFICATION
ON ANY FDA COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
Preliminarily, and I believe uncontroversially, we should
recognize that any defense based on FDA regulation would
have to be structured as a compliance with FDA regulatory
standards rather than as a defense based on FDA approval of
the drug in question. The reason is quite simple but based on
a fact that is not well known: the FDA's approval of a drug,
which includes a determination of the appropriate labeling (i.e.,
warnings) is wholly dependent on testing performed and
reported by the sponsoring manufacturer.73 The FDA conducts
none of the testing to demonstrate that a proposed new drug
is safe and effective required by the 1962 Kefauver-Harris
Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 4 for approv-
al of new drugs by the FDA. The FDA does review the results
of the tests performed by the manufacturer and submitted as
part of its NDA; sometimes the FDA will request additional in-
formation or tests. 5 In the end, it is the FDA that makes the
judgment whether a drug is safe and efficacious. Any conclu-
sion that the FDA's approval represents a considered
assessment that an approved drug's therapeutic benefits
outweigh its risks, however, is unwarranted without manufac-
turer investigation that complies with FDA requirements for
adequate and well-controlled studies of the new drug, accurate
reporting of the results of those tests, and truthful responses
to inquiries by the FDA.76
73. See 21 US.C. § 355(b)(1) (1994); see also Merrill, supra note 27, at 17 n.59.
For one commentator unaware of this fact, see Dueffert, supra note 13, at 206
(asserting that "a drug ... must undergo extensive testing by the Food and Drug
Administration").
74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)(1994); see also David A. Kessler, The Regulation of
Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 281, 281 (1989) ("[Tlhe FDA itself does
not investigate new drugs or conduct clinical trials.").
75. See Merrill, supra note 27, at 17 n.59.
76. A regulatory compliance defense, as opposed to anFDA approval defense, thus
responds to the critics of any defense based upon governmental regulation who argue
Statutory Compliance
482 University of Michigan Journal of Law Refo rm [VOL. 30:2&3
Once again, we must recognize the reality of regulatory
resource constraints: The FDA does not have the resources to
monitor and ensure universal compliance of a large, techno-
logically complex, and informationally massive industry."
Sometimes it is the tort system that uncovers instances of
noncompliance with FDA regulatory standards, rather than the
FDA itself.78 Nor can the FDA bring suit for every violation of
which it may become aware. Often informal negotiations
between the FDA and pharmaceutical companies take place,
especially when the situation falls in a regulatory gray area.79
Given the non-specific phrasing of many regulatory require-
ments (such as "efficacy" and "safety") and the vagaries of cost-
benefit analyses, those instances are not uncommon. Here, the
tort system operates to provide a stick (though its size is often
quite varied depending on the personal injury implications of
any violation) that supplements FDA enforcement: violations
of FDA safety regulations that are the legal cause of patient
injuries result in negligence per se."° There is good reason to
that the FDA is dependent on data from the industry it is supposed to regulate. See
John G. Culhane, The Limits of Product Liability Reform Within a Consumer
Expectation Model: A Comparison of Approaches Taken by the United States and the
European Union, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 75 n.303 (1995) (listing
authors who have criticized the FDA for inadequately protecting the public); Schwartz,
supra note 21, at 1387 (arguing that because the FDA has failed to require strict
compliance with its stringent safety standards, unsafe medical devices and prescrip-
tion drugs have reached the market); see also GARBER, supra note 8, at 127-28 (noting
that serious safety shortfalls that become known are more often the result of lack of
compliance with FDA standards than inadequate FDA standards).
77. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 59, at 25 ("Unfortunately,
recent events have raised doubts about the FDA's current capacity to conduct effective
law enforcement. The generic drug scandal exposed the Agency's vulnerability to
shoddy, and sometimes fraudulent, data submitted in support of new product
approvals."); see also Cooper, supra note 14, at 240; Schwartz, supra note 21, at
1387-89 (attributing the FDA's regulatory failures to both decreased resources and
increased responsibilities).
78. See, e.g., HALCION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at v, 18 (noting that
a tort suit first uncovered evidence of errors in IND studies for Halcion that were due
to poor oversight by manufacturer and may have been intentional). See generally Carl
T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability,
60 MO. L. REV. 1, 85 (1995) ("The common law provides a mechanism for developing
information-sometimes by prying it from the manufacturer's hands . . .).
79. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 49, 183 (detailing how informal pressure by the
FDA resulted in Richardson-Merrell ceasing its promotional efforts for Bendectin).
80. The stick is variable because, as with violations of other federal regulations,
many FDA violations may only be tangentially implicated in adverse drug effects, and
so the violation would not be a cause in fact or proximate cause of damages. See
Sheridan v. United States, 969 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that violation of
a federal regulation did not necessarily establish proximate cause); Stanton v. Astra
Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that violation of a
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believe that the threat of tort liability assists considerably in
effective enforcement of the nation's drug laws by the FDA;
both by encouraging voluntary compliance and by providing
leverage for the FDA in informal negotiations."'
Thus, the qualification reveals a silver lining: in addition to
the stick of negligence per se, a regulatory compliance defense
would add the carrot of a defense to a tort suit for complying
with FDA regulatory requirements in the IND process. This
incentive should influence manufacturers' compliance. Of
course, the incentive is prospective only: we can affect only
behavior in the future; testing of drugs that has already
occurred at the time of adoption of any defense would be
unaffected. The carrot should also provide the FDA greater
leverage in its negotiations with drug manufacturers with
regard to an NDA.
Another qualification and concern deserves mention. Both
the drug-lag scholarship and, even more significantly, the
emergence of the AIDS scourge have had an enormous impact
on the FDA in its review and approval of new drugs. In recent
years, the FDA has been criticized publicly for delays in
approval of new drugs, as exemplified in a harsh editorial in
the Wall Street Journal concerning the FDA's delay in ap-
proving a drug (t-PA) designed to prevent clotting in heart
attack victims:
regulation was not enough to establish cause in fact, although the court uses
.proximate cause" language). Not everyjurisdiction subscribes to the legal proposition
that violation of a regulatory safety provision is negligence per se. See, e.g., Sheridan,
969 F.2d at 75 (applying Maryland law); Eimers v. Honda Motor Co., 785 F. Supp.
1204, 1208-09 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (applying New York law).
81. Penalties imposed on manufacturers for violating the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act or FDA regulations are considerably more meager than the damages that
might be imposed on a manufacturer, as a result of tort actions. See Viscusi et al.,
supra note 17, at 1455 n.66. A variety of criminal statutes may be applicable in the
event of willful misconduct by a manufacturer, and penalties imposed pursuant to
such statutes can be more substantial than the civil penalties. See, e.g., Talbott v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 41-42 (D. Mass. 1994) (involving a heart catheter
manufacturer's executives who pleaded guilty to a variety of criminal charges
resulting in criminal and civil penalties exceeding $61 million), affd, 63 F.3d 25 (1st
Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1892 (1996); see also GREEN, supra note 26, at
86 (noting the criminal penalties imposed on Richardson-Merrell for false reporting
of studies in connection with MER/29). Of course, criminal charges are rarely filed
against manufacturers who violate FDA regulations.
Thus because of the potential amount of damage awards the tort system plays an
important role in making FDA regulations more effective. See, e.g., GARBER, supra
note 8, at 125 (stating that potential liability costs create an incentive for regulatory
compliance). A regulatory compliance defense would not seem, on the surface, to affect
this role, but we should be wary of the law of unintended consequences.
Statutory Compliance
484 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:2&3
Patients will die who would otherwise live longer. Medical
research has allowed statistics to become the supreme
judge of its inventions. The FDA, in particular its bureau
of drugs under Robert Temple, has driven that system to
its absurd extreme .... The advisory panel's suggestion
that TPA's [sic] sponsor conduct further mortality studies
poses grave ethical questions .... We'll put it bluntly: Are
American doctors going to let people die to satisfy the
bureau of drugs' chi-square studies?
82
By the mid-1980s the FDA began responding to this criticism
and had modified its practices to speed the approval of espe-
cially valuable drugs. The issue of delay in approving drugs
and in making them available, especially to terminally ill
patients, has taken on increasing significance in the quest to
find drugs to ameliorate, cure, or prevent AIDS. As a result,
the FDA has adopted provisions to permit desperately ill
patients to obtain drugs before preapproval testing is complete
and to speed the approval of new drugs with the promise of
providing significant therapeutic advantages for those with
conditions that are life-threatening or risk irreversible serious
health consequences.83
Although a recent General Accounting Office study found
that the FDA has reduced the delay in approving new drugs
significantly,84 political pressure continues to mount for further
82. Human Sacrifices, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1987, at 30. Subsequent research
found that t-PA reduced mortality in heart attack victims from an average of 7.3%
with alternative treatments to 6.3% percent with t-PA. See The GUSTO Investigators,
An International Randomized Trial Comparing Four Thrombolytic Strategies for Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 677 (1993).
The FDA has, over the past 15 years, become more responsive to the drug-lag
criticism. See BRODY, supra note 11, at 52. The deregulation fervor that marked the
Reagan administration no doubt contributed to the sensitivity and responsiveness of
the FDA. See generally TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 71, at 94 (noting the dramatic
increase in drug approvals in 1981).
83. See BRODY, supra note 11, at 169-81 (describing three programs that
responded to the need for quicker access to AIDS treatments).
84. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOJ-PEMD-96-9: FDA REVIEW TIMES:
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMIrTEE ON HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE 8-9 (1996) (noting that during the six-year period of
1987-1992, time for FDA approval dropped from 33 months to 19 months; approval
times for drugs that are new molecular entities is tending toward two years in all
Western countries); see also David A. Kessler et al., Approval of New Drugs in the
United States: Comparison with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, 276 JAMA
1826 (1996) (reporting that U.S. drug approvals are comparable with Great Britain
and ahead of Germany and Japan).
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reform in the new drug approval process.8" Although the
reforms to date appear quite modest and generally beneficial,
continued pressure to accelerate, streamline, outsource, or
compromise the approval process may affect the arguments
above about the optimality of FDA decisions about NDAs. As
David Kessler, then-Commissioner of the FDA, has observed:
On analysis, it is important to recognize that the FDA
could easily accelerate the availability of new drugs. Like-
wise, it could provide greater assurances that drugs reach-
ing the market are safe and effective. Neither goal alone
is sufficient, however. The agency's job is to balance the
need to make drugs available quickly with the need to
ensure that patients do not receive unsafe or ineffective
products. Since it cannot pursue any single objective,
criticism can always be leveled against the FDA from either
direction.8"
IV. THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF
A COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
A. Preapproval Regulation
To appreciate what will be required if a compliance-with-
FDA-standards defense is adopted, we should briefly consider
the new drug testing process.87 As the following discussion will
reveal, the process of testing a new drug is lengthy,
85. See Revitalizing New Product Development From Clinical Trials Through FDA
Development: Hearing on S.1477 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong. 1 (1996) (opening statement of Sen. Kassebaum on reform of
FDA approval on drugs and devices); Jocelyn Kaiser, FDA Reform Starts Down the
Track, 271 Sci. 1228, 1228 (1996) (discussing a proposed bill that would force the FDA
to speed up its review process or contract out new drug applications for faster
processing).
86. Kessler, supra note 74, at 286.
87. The condensed and stylized account of new drug testing set forth below is
drawn from GREEN, supra note 26, at 50-51. For more detailed explanations of the
NDA testing process, see Kessler, supra note 74, at 281-85. See also JERRY T. GIBSON,
MEDICATION, LAW AND BEHAVIOR 123-45 (1976) (detailing the three-phase procedure
of the Investigational New Drug Application and the subsequent NDA required by
the FDA); WARDELL & LASAGNA, supra note 10, at 19-25 (describing post-1962
developments in the new drug approval process).
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complicated, and heavily regulated by the FDA."8 The process
is also one that evolves in response to advancements in the
sciences employed. A study that might nieet the FDA standard
for an adequate and well-controlled study in 1962 might not
meet the same standard if performed today. 9 Ascertaining
compliance by the pharmaceutical manufacturer and, if non-
compliance occurred in some respect, its implications in a
hypothetical causal chain that led to the plaintiff's injury is
likely to entail substantial, perhaps enormous, transaction
costs. 90
Animal studies are required before an IND, which is required
as a condition for shipping unapproved drugs in interstate
commerce, is filed with the FDA. These studies are conducted
in the laboratory on animals or through in vitro (test tube)
testing of animal or human tissue. Dozens, hundreds, or even
thousands of biologically active agents may be tested in this
initial stage of drug development for every drug that receives
final approval. The winnowing of potential new drugs during
the IND process is in significant part responsible for the fact
that it takes, on average, twelve years and costs more than
$200 million to develop and obtain approval for a new drug.9'
If the initial phase of testing by the manufacturer (or a private
laboratory hired by the manufacturer) is successful, an IND is
filed with the FDA. The FDA must decide whether, based on
the results of the laboratory testing, human clinical testing
should be permitted. The IND submission does not require
positive approval by the FDA-it becomes effective unless the
FDA objects within thirty days of submission. 92
Human subject testing entails three phases.93 In the initial
phase, the drug is tested on a limited group of humans to
understand absorption, elimination, metabolization, and
toleration by a relatively small group (usually less than a
88. Some of the FDA's regulation of the IND process is motivated by concern for
the safety of the subjects involved in the IND testing process. That aspect of the FDA's
regulations need not concern us, as they would not bear on post-marketing risks for
patients injured by a pharmaceutical.
89. See Kessler, supra note 74, at 286.
90. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 1130-31 (noting that regulatory agencies may
not have considered the precise issue before a court, weakening the justification for
courts' reliance on agency standards).
91. See Joseph A. Di Masi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 10 J. HEALTH EcON. 107, 125 (1991).
92. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b)(1) (1996).
93. See id. § 312.21.
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hundred) of healthy human subjects. Toxicity is also examined,
but the initial phase ordinarily does not attempt to assess the
efficacy of the drug. If the first phase is completed successfully,
the next stage is to study patients who have the disease or
condition that the investigational drug is designed to treat.
This initial efficacy examination (safety is also assessed) is
conducted as a controlled study on a smaller cohort of patients
(several hundred) than the third phase, which entails expanded
clinical testing of the drug. The third phase typically involves
several thousand patients to provide improved ability to detect
infrequent effects that the drug may have on patients who take
it. Most often the human subject testing is conducted by
medical center researchers who are hired by the sponsoring
manufacturer. The third phase is often conducted by multiple
private physicians who are supervised by and report to the
manufacturer to obtain access to the number of patients
required for the third phase. In all cases, however, clinical
investigators report to the manufacturer, not to the FDA.94 By
statute, the studies conducted must be "adequate and well-
controlled."95 Because the perfect clinical study has yet to be
performed, this general standard gives the FDA considerable
discretion to require the sponsoring manufacturer to conduct
additional studies (in what might be termed a fourth phase).
If the IND testing proves successful, the manufacturer
submits an NDA to the FDA, which must approve the NDA
before the manufacturer may market the drug. NDAs must
contain the results of all animal and human testing, proposed
usage of the drug, and the proposed labeling (including warn-
ings) that will accompany the drug. An NDA typically consists
of a hundred thousand pages or more-the NDA for Prozac
consisted of a million pages that included reports on twenty-
five premarketing studies of the drug.9" FDA review of an NDA
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1994).
95. Id. § 355(d).
96. See Materials submitted by James T. Burns, Eli Lilly & Co., for the Colloquy
on Products Liability: Comprehensive Discussions on theRestatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability 12 (Mar. 22-23, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform); see also Revitalizing New Product Development from Clinical
Trials Through FDA Review: Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong. 5 (1996) (statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum)
(referring to a recent NDA that contained 200,000 pages). See generally John A.
Norris, Fulfilling FDA's Vision of Faster Drug Review, in FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
FDA CONSUMER SPECIAL REPORT, FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988), reprinted in BIOTECHNOLOGY: NEW
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often entails negotiation between the sponsor and the agency
about the adequacy of the clinical data generated by the NDA
studies and the contents of the drug's labeling. The latter
addresses the conditions for which the drug is approved, a
great deal of information about how the drug should be used,
and safety related information that includes contraindications,
known adverse effects, and precautions in usage to avoid
identified risks.97 Because drugs cannot be modified to reduce
risk, full information about the inherent and avoidable risks
posed by the drug are essential aspects of the drug's safety. We
should understand that the drug's labeling is an essential
element of an NDA approval by the FDA.
The IND process has three important consequences for a
government compliance defense. First, as previously men-
tioned, because all information relevant to the regulatory
decision is developed by the sponsor (or its agents), the defense
must be available only if the sponsor complied with all regula-
tory requirements. The mere fact of government approval of the
product should not provide adequate grounds for the defense.9"
Despite the theoretical existence of FDA enforcement of its
IND and NDA regulations and the tort stick of negligence per
se for violation of government safety standards, the pharma-
ceutical industry's history is littered with instances of deliber-
ate or negligent withholding of information from the FDA in
the new drug approval process.99 If a government standards
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS 130 (Practising Law Institute
ed., 1988) (describing NDA's generally, including their length).
97.. See Quirk, supra note 64, at 202.
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring that an NDA contain "full
reports of investigations" conducted on the drug for which the sponsor seeks approval).
99. See Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1389 (4th Cir. 1995)
(involving a manufacturer failing to provide drug experience reports on a timely
basis); Hearings on Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare and
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 725 (1975) (statement of a former FDA Commissioner character-
izing the problem of false and misleading reporting to the FDA as "serious and
grave"); ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 92-96 (summarizing the inaccurate and in-
complete data submitted to the FDA in support of the NDA for Naproxen); GARBER,
supra note 8, at 188 (noting that "there is substantial evidence of incomplete
compliance with FDA regulations"); GREEN, supra note 26, at 83-86, 128-29 (describ-
ing the events surrounding the cover-up of Bendectin's adverse effects); Merrill, supra
note 27, at 5-6 (1973) (recounting McNeil Laboratories' concealment of the adverse
effects of Flexin); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1348-52 (describing several instances
in which drug manufacturers concealed the adverse effects of new drugs from the
FDA); Excerpts from Dr. Goddard's Address, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1966, at 24 (express-
ing dismay on the part of the then FDA Commissioner, Dr. Goddard, at poor quality
and dishonesty in the submission of investigational drug studies).
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defense is to serve the public interest instead of serving as a
shield for industry misfeasance, the defense must be structured
as a compliance, rather than an approval, defense."0 Initially,
I assume that the defense would still be available despite a
failure to comply with regulations if the failure would not have
made any difference in the FDA's consideration of the NDA or
in the proposed labeling. Thus, unless it were shown that the
FDA would have refused to approve the drug or insisted on
additional information in the labeling that would have affected
the plaintiffs use of the drug, a plaintiff still could not prevail.
This treatment is not the only possibility, and later this Article
considers alternatives.
Second, once we recognize that the defense is based on
compliance,' 0 ' the advantage of ex ante approval is lost: once
Of course, all of these instances of withholding (or mischaracterization) of
information from the FDA represent a partial numerator without a denominator-that
is they reveal nothing about the rate at which such episodes occur. My intuition is
that today they represent a reasonably small percentage of NDAs, but, of course,
others might have different intuitions. Nevertheless, given the small number of drug
products liability cases currently brought, see supra note 24, another important
question about which I have no evidence is the percentage of lawsuits in which the
manufacturer has failed to provide complete information to the FDA.
100. The Michigan statute, which provides that a drug is not defective if approved
by the FDA, is the most problematic of the existing state reform provisions. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West Supp. 1995). The statute has an exception for
fraud on the FDA that, had the fraud not existed, would have resulted in a denial of
approval. The Michigan statute, however, immunizes the drug manufacturer who
knowingly submits false data minimizing a side effect from which a plaintiff subse-
quently suffers, if submission of accurate information would have resulted not in
denial of the NDA, but in a requirement for warnings in the drug labeling or
limitations on prescribing the drug. Consider Accutane: the drug causes birth defects
but is nevertheless available on the market with extensive precautions required before
prescribing to women of child-bearing age. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2076-79
(1996); Birth Defects Caused by Isotretinoin-New Jersey, 124 ARCHIVES OF DERMATOL-
OGY 838, 838 (1988). Under the Michigan statute, a manufacturer could not be held
liable even if it intentionally had failed to reveal to the FDA any evidence of the drug's
teratogenicity during preapproval testing. To take another egregious example,
Michigan's statute would have immunized the manufacturer of thalidomide and its
U.S. licensee from any products liability claim that it negligently conducted
preapproval testing of the drug. The drug was never approved in the United States
by the FDA because it had been developed, tested, and marketed in Europe, and its
teratogenicity was discovered before the FDA completed its review of the NDA.
Several thalidomide children were born in the United States during the course of a
shamelessly excessive preapproval clinical testing that was designed to promote the
drug. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 64-78 (describing thalidomide's journey from
development and marketing in Europe to lawsuits in the United States).
101. Some state statutes that provide a defense based on FDA approval have
exceptions for the situation in which a manufacturer engages in fraudulent misrepre-
sentation or withholds information required to be submitted to the FDA. See sources
cited supra note 13. However, if the justification for an FDA regulatory oversight
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suit is brought, courts will have to examine compliance ex post.
The tort system, not the FDA, will be required to make a
determination of the manufacturer's compliance with require-
ments governing the testing of new drugs and accurate report-
ing of the outcome of the testing. This leads ineluctably to the
third concern: the enormously complicated-both factually and
legally-inquiry that will be required to determine compliance.
When we recall the extensive testing required and examine the
complexity of that testing and the reporting of the results to
the FDA, we should become quite leery of the inquiry that a
government compliance defense will impose on courts, juries,
and pharmaceutical products liability litigants.
A recent report by an FDA task force investigating allega-
tions of misconduct in connection with the prescription drug
Halcion nicely captures the difficulties that can arise:
The review has required the Task Force to address events
and processes retrospectively, going back more than two
decades, and to evaluate those events, keeping in mind how
regulatory and scientific approaches have changed over
time. Actions or choices that may seem clear today may
have been less obvious to the decision makers involved in
the issues at the time decisions were being made. In addi-
tion, the Task Force observes that the debate over Halcion's
safety and efficacy and the actions of Upjohn and the FDA
involve complex scientific and regulatory issues about
which reasonable people may differ."0 2
The extensiveness of pre-approval testing and the written
record documenting it (the NDA on file with the FDA) may,
with some frequency, contain a variety of mistakes, deceptions,
or other culpable conduct ("errors"), ranging from the minor to
defense is the FDA's superior information and technical expertise, then it should not
matter why the FDA does not have relevant information. If the FDA does not have
the information for any reason, the basis for displacing tort law is missing, provided,
of course, that the missing information would have had an impact on the FDA's
decisionmaking. Cf Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 580-81 (3d
Cir. 1983) (finding manufacturer negligent in part because it failed to provide adverse
drug reaction reports required by FDA regulations).
102. HALCION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at i. The Task Force concluded
that the Department of Justice would have to determine whether there was a violation
of criminal laws that prohibit fraud on a federal agency. See id. at ii-iii, 29.
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the egregious.' If, after extensive discovery,10 4 errors are
uncovered, two and possibly three further inquiries would be
required: (1) does the error raise a legitimate issue about
whether the manufacturer met existing FDA requirements for
the IND process; (2) if yes, would the drug and its existing
labeling nevertheless have been approved by the FDA despite
the error; and (3) and if the labeling would have been different,
would any modification have affected the adverse reaction
suffered by the plaintiff?
The courts will have to conduct this inquiry for the most part
without the benefit of a prior FDA judgment on the first two
matters. In those instances in which the errors discovered were
previously unknown to the FDA, the court must determine
whether the errors compromised the FDA's conclusion that
"adequate and well-controlled studies" were conducted. This
sort of general, imprecise, contextual, and normative inquiry,
often handled within the FDA by informal negotiation with a
manufacturer whose NDA raises questions rather than through
formal determinations of compliance, is not the sort of inquiry
that falls squarely within the institutional competence of
common law courts. The question of compliance may also
require interpretation and application of specific and quite
complicated FDA regulatory standards. 105
Assessing the significance of noncompliance will be difficult
as well. The inquiry will be the hypothetical question of what
would have happened within the FDA if the error had not
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104. Discovery might extend as far as deposing individual physicians, their nurses,
and office staff who participated in multi-center clinical testing and obtaining patient
records, in situations in which carelessness or worse is suspected in the phase three
NDA testing. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 176.
105. For example, FDA regulations for the content of an NDA, which comprise 10
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, require that the manufacturer provide the
following:
A description and analysis of any other data or information relevant to an
evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug product obtained or
otherwise received by the applicant from any source, foreign or domestic,
including information derived from clinical investigations, including controlled
and uncontrolled studies of uses of the drug other than those proposed in the
application, commercial marketing experience, reports in the scientific literature,
and unpublished scientific papers.
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (1996); cf. Stanton, 718 F.2d at 558-63 (holding that a
manufacturer who negligently failed to comply with adverse drug reporting require-
ments was negligent per se).
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occurred. Because the FDA limits the circumstances under
which its employees are allowed to testify in court, 10 6 the courts
will be left to answer that question without the most salient
evidence available. Or, we may be confronted with the specta-
cle of one former FDA official testifying about what action she
would have taken, while another retired FDA official explains
that he would have done something quite different.0 7 These
counterfactual inquiries are not the stuff from which confident-
ly accurate outcomes are reached in litigation.
Of course, we could fashion a compliance defense that would
not require this inquiry-once noncompliance was determined
the defense would be unavailable-but only at the cost of
driving a quite substantial-perhaps fatal-wedge into the
protection afforded by the defense. 108 If the compliance defense
is lost any time there is some default by the manufacturer in
meeting FDA requirements, the protection afforded by the
defense would begin to resemble Swiss cheese.'0 9
Concerns similar to these have led a number of courts to
decline to adopt a noncompliance exception for federal pre-
emption of tort claims involving medical devices. Thus, in
Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc.," the court refused to permit the plaintiff
to prove her allegations that defendants had committed fraud
by deceiving the FDA about the safety of the Shiley heart valve
106. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1995) (prohibiting an FDA employee from testifying in
court about "any information acquired in the discharge of his official duties" unless
previously authorized by the FDA Commissioner).
107. Such an episode occurred in the Bendectin litigation, when a former FDA
pharmacologist testified that had she seen the original of a study that was sanitized
by the manufacturer before its submission to the FDA, she would have recommended
that the drug's approval be withdrawn or, at least, that a birth defect warning be
provided. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 140. The manufacturer then had the FDA
Commissioner at the time testify that he would have overridden any such recommen-
dation. Trial Transcript at 8116, Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., No. 7-255-Orl-Civ
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 1980).
108. Other options include employing an objective "materiality" standard, see infra
text following note 119, and shifting the burden of proof on causation to the defendant.
See Frank M. McClellan et al., Strict Liability for Prescription Drug Injuries: The
Improper Marketing Theory, 26 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 34-35 (1981).
109. Although such a rule would gut the defense, there is some justification for
it. The defense is provided because of the superior expertise of the FDA in making
judgments about drug safety and appropriate labeling. If a manufacturer's nontrivial
error deprives the FDA of relevant information in making that determination, asking
the courts to determine what the FDA would have done is at least modestly inconsis-
tent with the justification behind the defense. Of course, there may be cases in which
the FDA has already responded to the newly emergent information that was not made
available at the time of NDA approval.
110. 835 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
WINTER AND SPRING 1997] Statutory Compliance
because of concern that permitting such an exception to
preemption would create such an enormous hole in the defense
as to render it futile in protecting manufacturers from tort
suits. 1 ' The court also expressed its doubt about the ability of
judges and juries to "untangl[e] the bramble of procedures and
regulations governing pre-market approval and later reporting
requirements.""l2 In several similar contexts, courts have
foregone resolving questions about regulatory standards and
compliance without prior administrative agency consideration,
recognizing the expertise and discretion reposed in the admin-
istrative agency responsible for oversight.
1 3
Another significant matter is the extent to which a compli-
ance defense will obviate the need for courts and juries to
resolve the difficult causal questions that arise in drug cases:
whether the drug is capable of causing disease, and if so,
whether it caused the individual.plaintiffs disease or injury.11 4
111. See id. at 1021.
112. Id. at 1022. See also Michael v. Shiley, 46 F.3d 1316, 1329 (3d Cir.) ("In sum
this claim requires a court, applying state law, to perform the same functions initially
entrusted to the FDA."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Reeves v. Acromed Corp.,
44 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Given the FDA's central role in reviewing and
approving devices under the MDAs [Medical Device Amendments], the FDA is in the
best position to decide whether [the device manufacturer] withheld material informa-
tion from the agency and, if so, the appropriate sanction."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2251 (1995). But cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2256 (1996) (holding that
plaintiffs state law claim that defendant's violations of FDA regulations were
negligent or resulted in a defective product was not preempted by Medical Device
Amendments).
The First Circuit extended this position to its extreme in Talbot v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995), in which the court held the plaintiffs state law claim was
preempted by the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1988), despite the fact that the manufacturer pled guilty to
defrauding the FDA in its applications for premarketing approval of the heart catheter
that failed during surgery and killed the plaintiffs decedent. The court expressed the
concern that the FDA was the entity with the expertise to determine compliance and
that leaving such a determination to state courts in products liability actions might
result in "numerous inconsistent interpretations and applications" of the Medical
Device Amendments. Id. at 29-30.
113. See Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
comparing advertisements with approved labeling of a pesticide "does not clearly
establish-one way or the other-whether the advertisement claims 'substantially
differ' from the labeling claims," which agency regulations prohibit); Sandoz Pharm.
Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230-31 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to
decide whether an ingredient in cough medicine was properly labeled "active" or
"inactive," pursuant to regulations of the FDA where the FDA had not yet addressed
the question).
114. Because of the nature of scientific evidence, which is almost always developed
in studies involving groups, both inquiries are logically necessary. See generally Linda
Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 121, 167 (Federal Judicial Center 1994) (discussing the role of science in
proving general causation and the legal treatment of specific causation).
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Assessing causation has been one of the most controversial
aspects of modern pharmaceutical litigation'15 and eliminating
the need for juries to delve into the complex and difficult
scientific issues required for this inquiry might be a significant
advantage.
To the extent that a regulatory compliance defense prevents
suits from being filed, all issues are eliminated from jury
consideration. In those cases litigated by a plaintiff claiming
a failure to comply with FDA regulations, however, I am not
sure that the causal issues could be avoided, at least not in all
cases. Even if the fact finder were persuaded that the manufac-
turer violated FDA requirements and that the FDA would not
have permitted the pharmaceutical on the market, the manu-
facturer should still not be held liable if the drug does not
cause the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff or did not
cause the particular plaintiff's injury. Thus, manufacturers
should be free, as they are without a regulatory compliance
defense, to show that plaintiffs injury is the result of some
cause other than the manufacturer's drug or that the drug does
not cause the injury from which the plaintiff suffers. Other-
wise, the defendant's actions simply have not caused the
plaintiffs harm. Of course, there may be cases in which causa-
tion is not contested, as in a case in which the issue is the
adequacy of a warning of an admitted side effect. However,
even without a regulatory compliance defense, the jury would
not be required to address these causal issues.
Another quite different concern is the subtle and subcon-
scious biases that affect investigators conducting the studies
required for approval of a new drug. The concern is not with
outright deceptions, but with the effect of the financial conse-
quences of the test's outcome either on the manufacturer
conducting them or even on independent investigators hired
by the manufacturer to conduct the tests. Both personal
relationships with the sponsor and the prospect of future
grant support may play an influential role. One empirical
study of independent researchers found that the source of
funding was associated with the outcome of the study."6
115. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 215-16 (1991).
116. See Richard A. Davidson, Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials,
1 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 155, 155 (1986). The results of this study may have been
affected by confounding factors or by non-random selection bias-pharmaceutical
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Studies funded by sources other than the sponsor favored the
new therapy sixty-one percent of the time. 117 By contrast,
studies that were funded by the sponsor found the new
therapy preferable eighty-nine percent of the time." 8 This
bias affects the accuracy of the testing conducted, thereby
compromising regulatory decisionmaking. But this problem is
not a. new one nor one of which the FDA is unaware" 9and
therefore may be neutralized in the NDA review by FDA staff.
At a minimum, it complicates and extends the FDA's review
process; at worst, it may contribute to the post-approval risk
problem, a matter discussed in the next section.
In the end, the concerns raised above, while serious, may not
be fatal to a compliance defense. Trivial or modest errors that
are immaterial are unlikely ever to be uncovered because of
search costs. Errors that at least are related to serious adverse
reaction risks will likely be uncovered, either by the FDA or
by plaintiffs lawyers. The question of tying the error to the
approval or labeling decision might be avoided by an objective
materiality standard for errors, although that will require the
courts to do that for which the FDA is far better suited. Al-
though there are substantial investigative costs imposed by a
compliance defense, at least there is reason to believe that the
approval determination made by the FDA is a reasonably
optimal one, one that is probably better than any alternative
determination.
Thus, if we could freeze time (and our knowledge of risk) at
the point of FDA approval of an NDA, we might be inclined to
opt for an FDA compliance defense. But we cannot freeze time;
it marches on and with it our storehouse of information chang-
es, often radically. And it is the post-approval period that
raises the most serious questions about the viability of a
regulatory compliance defense because additional significant
information is uncovered, manufacturers undertake marketing
activity that affects the benefit-risk ratio of the drugs that are
promoted, and the FDA has inadequate resources to enforce
companies are more likely to sponsor studies that show their drugs to be efficacious.
See id. at 157; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 242-46 (explaining that inconsis-
tencies in testing that support the commercial interests of the testers may result
from shared "commercial perspectives" among industrial scientists and company
managers); BRODY, supra note 11, at 145-50.
117. See Davidson, supra note 116, at 157.
118. See id.
119. See Quirk, supra note 64, at 205.
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regulatory compliance. Most importantly, accommodation of
these post-approval concerns in any regulatory compliance
defense could make the defense largely chimerical. We simply
may not be able to channel the expertise of the FDA in the
pharmaceutical approval process into streamlining the tort
system.
B. Post-Approval Risk Identification,
Regulation, and Enforcement
The post-approval story begins with the recognition that after
a drug's approval by the FDA and general distribution to the
public much critical information emerges and activity occurs
that exposes and affects a drug's risks and safety. We should
also recall that these risks play a central role in most of the
pharmaceutical litigation that takes place.12 ° The three phases
of the IND human testing process"' are inadequate to identify
all of the significant adverse effects that a drug may cause.
Identifying those previously undiscovered risks, taking appro-
priate precautionary actions, and taming the manufacturer's
incentives to advertise and promote its drugs in a manner that
encourages overuse (and thereby excess risk) or dangerous "off-
label" uses... are the post-approval areas of concern for a
regulatory compliance defense.
A number of reasons explain the inability of the IND testing
process to identify all of the risks associated with use of a drug.
First, it is often difficult both to anticipate all of the adverse
effects that a drug may cause and to build into the clinical
investigations a mechanism to detect those side effects.' 23
120. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 228.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
122. Drugs are approved by the FDA to treat conditions for which the manufactur-
er has shown the drug to be safe and efficacious. Once the FDA approves a drug,
physicians are free to prescribe it for other medical purposes. The FDA's authority
with regard to off-label prescribing is limited to its control over manufacturers'
advertising and promotion. Off-label prescribing of a drug may account for 25% or
more of all prescriptions. See Milt Freudenheim, FDA Gets Tough on Drugs Offered
for Unapproved Uses, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1991, at 1); see generally Lars Noah,
Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & Toxics
LIAB. 139 (1994); Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and "Off-Label"
Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (1996).
123. See Gerald A Faich, Adverse Drug Experience Reporting and Product Liability,
41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 444, 444 (1986).
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Second, because even the final and largest testing phase of
the pre-marketing approval process is conducted on a limited
number of human subjects,'24 if a given side effect is rare
enough it may not emerge in the clinical testing phase. 26
Third, often the subjects involved in the clinical trial will be
more homogenous than the population that will ultimately use
the drug. Thus, inevitably, additional hazards of new drugs
emerge as they are put into widespread use in a heteroge-
neous population. 12 Oral contraceptives had been marketed
and used by thousands of women for three years before their
tendency to cause blood clots in a small number of users was
discovered.'27 Until recently, drugs were not tested on
pregnant women during the IND process. For example,
Bendectin, a drug for morning sickness, was never subjected
to reproductive toxicity testing before its approval by the
FDA.12 Fourth, the widespread use of a newly approved drug
may also provide new information that has implications for
expanding or narrowing indications for use and about the
efficacy of the drug; a drug may be used differently or for a
longer period by the general population than those involved in
clinical trials. 29  That information, which would affect
prescribing practices, is also important information for proper
use of the drug that should be included in the drug's labeling.
Fifth, the IND testing process is unlikely to reveal
interactions with other drugs. 3 ° Finally, the hazards of drugs
causing diseases only after lengthy latency periods remain
unknown until well into the post-approval period, as was the
case with, for example, DES."3'
124. • See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
125. See H.R. REP. No. 91-931, at 11-12 (1970).
126. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHOLESTEROL TREATMENT: A
REVIEW OF THE CLINICAL TRIALS EVIDENCE 3 (1996) (noting that clinical trials of the
efficacy of drugs in reducing cholesterol levels ignored women, elderly, and minori-
ties).
127. See HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULA-
TION, AND USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 59-60 (1970).
128. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 329-30.
129. See, e.g., HALCION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 14 (noting that the
recommended dose for Halcion was reduced in response to adverse drug reports).
130. See David A. Kessler, Introducing MEDWatch: A New Approach to Reporting
Medication and Device Adverse Effects and Product Problems, 269 JAMA 2765, 2765
(1993).
131. See ROBERTA J. APFEL & SUSAN M. FISHER, To Do No HARM: DES AND THE
DILEMMAS OF MODERN MEDICINE 19-25 (1984); A.L. Herbst et al., Adenocarcinoma
of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance
in Young Women, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 878, 880 (1971).
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These impediments to complete identification of a drug's
risks create a significant pocket of unknown hazards that
exist despite FDA approval and even manufacturer compli-
ance with FDA requirements for IND testing. The General
Accounting Office (the GAO) recently studied the incidence of
hazards that do not emerge until the post-approval period,
their magnitude, and the impact on the drug's benefit-risk
balance and the adequacy of the drug's labeling. 132 The GAO
reviewed all prescription drugs approved by the FDA from
1976 through 1985. By reviewing drugs removed from the
market or drugs that had undergone a revision in their label-
ing indicating additional adverse effects, the GAO found that
slightly more than half of 198 prescription drugs approved by
the FDA had serious post-approval risks that went undetected
in the IND phase. 133 Thus, it is sometimes said that the post-
approval process constitutes "phase IV" of new drug testing.
The mechanism for tracking a drug's safety in the post-
marketing period is the Adverse Reaction Report (ARR)134 or
its predecessor, the Drug Experience Report (DER). The ARR
is a report of an adverse event after the use of a pharmaceu-
tical by a physician or consumer to the manufacturer. Periodic
reports are made to the manufacturer; by law manufacturers
must report to the FDA "any adverse event associated with
the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug
related."35 Prompt reporting of serious and unexpected ad-
verse drug experiences is required, as is any increase in
frequency of a particular adverse event. 136 In theory at least,
the FDA monitors adverse drug reactions (ADRs), looking for
132. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW: POSTAPPROVAL RISKS
1976-85 (1990).
133. See id. at 3. The GAO defined serious risks as ones requiring withdrawal of
the drug, changes in labeling that reflected a serious medical problem, or identifica-
tion of a serious risk in the FDA Drug Bulletin. See id. at 3-4; see also GOODMAN
AND GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 64 (Alfred G. Gilman
et al. eds., 8th ed. 1990) (noting that 50% of adverse reactions are identified in the
post-marketing period).
134. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1996); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 7471 (1985) (explaining
that "the primary objective of the adverse drug experience reporting system is to
signal potential serious safety problems with marketed drugs").
135. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a). The manufacturer also must submit reports periodical-
ly that describe its actions in response to the adverse drug experience information it
has received, any post-approval studies that have been performed on the drug,
published reports or studies of the drug, and any foreign experience with the drug.
See id. § 314.80(b)-(d).
136. See id. § 314.80(c)(1).
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trends that suggest the need for further investigation.'37
There are a number of forces at work that make (and have
made) the ADR notification process less than entirely effective
in identifying adverse side effects. 138 But the key concerns for
purposes of a regulatory compliance defense are the
significant role of the post-approval period in identifying new
risks related to drugs, the incorporation of that information
and its implications for prescribing practices into the drug's
labeling, and the FDA's ability to monitor both manufacturer
compliance and the information produced by the ADR process.
Reporting by manufacturers to the FDA, despite the legal
requirement, has been less than perfect. Some notable exam-
ples of flagrant manufacturer disregard for this requirement
have been documented, sometimes as the result of a tort
suit.'39 More subtle defalcations are harder, if not impossible,
to detect, yet no doubt exist. 4 ° The marketing and profit
incentives for a pharmaceutical manufacturer are contrary to
thorough and accurate gathering and reporting of ADRs.
If the FDA had adequate resources to monitor manufacturer
post-approval reporting behavior, detect violations, impose
adequate sanctions, and thereby provide an appropriate
deterrent, we could be more sanguine about the efficacy of the
ARR process.' But, once again, there is the problem of inade-
quate regulatory resources.
137. See Thomas P. Gross, The Analysis of Postmarketing Drug Surveillance Data
at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, in DRUG EPIDEMIOLOGY AND POST-
MARKETING SURVEILLANCE 1 (Brian L. Strom & Giampaolo Velo eds., 1992).
138. The primary problem is the identification and reporting of adverse effects by
patients and physicians. One study concludes that "less than one percent of serious
ADRs are reported directly to the FDA." H. Denman Scott et al., Rhode Island Physi-
cians'Recognition and Reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions, 70 R.I. MED. J. 311, 313
(1987). Recently the FDA announced a new program designed to increase reporting
of adverse events by physicians. See Kessler, supra note 130, at 2767.
139. See, e.g., Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1379 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the defendant's withholding of ADR's from 1980 to 1988 from the FDA
justified award of punitive damages); FDA, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 50 (1990) (explaining criminal conviction of pharmaceutical employees who
suppressed ADRs for the blood pressure medication Selacryn in the early 1980s);
Merrill, supra note 27, at 5-6 (noting McNeil Laboratories' delay in notifying FDA
of cases of liver damage of patients using its drug until three to five years after
McNeil received information from physicians).
140. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 129 (describing how a drug manufacturer
persuaded doctors who called to report birth defects associated with maternal use of
a drug to characterize their calls as "inquiries" rather than reports so as to avoid
having to report calls to the FDA as an ARR).
141. The enforcement provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are
contained in 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-335 (1994).
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Thus, any regulatory compliance defense should include
compliance with post-approval FDA regulations regarding the
adverse drug reporting program. This requirement then leads
to the same problem identified with regard to preapproval
regulatory compliance: The courts will have to confront and
resolve the question of manufacturer compliance with adverse
drug reporting regulations. This task will require factual,
legal, and evaluative determinations as difficult as those
required in determining the manufacturer's compliance with
pre-approval testing and reporting requirements. 14 2
The silver lining in this ADR-regulation compliance re-
quirement is that, like IND compliance, the carrot of a de-
fense to tort liability is provided to manufacturers who do
comply with the ADR regulations. How much incentive that
carrot might provide depends on a number of other factors,
including how competitive the market is for the drug in ques-
tion, how significant the post-approval risks are in their
impact on the market for the drug, and the significance of the
drug in contributing to the manufacturer's overall profits. But
the point is that we should expect some marginal effect on
compliance with ADR reporting requirements.
The ADR process is not, however, an end in itself. It serves
the instrumental functions of assuring that all identified
risks are communicated to physicians who make the consum-
ption decision and weeding out those drugs whose additional
risks overtake the therapeutic benefits of the drug. At the
same time, overwarning has its costs, 4 3 and the FDA fre-
quently resists labeling changes that manufacturers
propose.'" Labeling changes for existing drugs require
142. See Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 563 (3d Cir. 1983).
143. See Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 81 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1139, 1150 (1987) ("Warnings that are too severe are as bad as those that
are too soft. Both tend to distort ... the relevant patient or consumer choices. The
full costs of overwarning would only be known if legal actions were available to
people deterred from taking needed therapy by excessive warnings."); Margaret
Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compliance, and Patient
Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1481, 1501 (1994) (expressing concern about infor-
mation overload); Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to
Know" from the "Need to Know" about Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON
REG. 293, 381-91 (1994) (explaining two consequences of overwarning: overreaction
and dilution in effectiveness); Viscusi et al., supra note 17, at 1468 (arguing that
overwarning hinders the ability of doctors to distinguish the relative risks of certain
drugs).
144. See Gilhooley, supra note 143, at 1485 & n.8 (listing cases that reflect FDA
efforts to discourage warnings).
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submission of a supplemental NDA,'45 as the labeling of a
drug is integral to its receiving FDA approval. An exception
permits a drug manufacturer to change its labeling and then
to seek approval after the change, 46 but that exception is
somewhat narrower than is evident. Manufacturers are
reluctant to change their labeling without at least tacit
informal approval by FDA staff in the reviewing division of
the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
Informal consultations are the norm, and unless the
manufacturer can persuade FDA staff that a labeling change
is desirable, subsequent disapproval along with the deteriora-
tion in good will with the FDA deters many manufacturers
from making unapproved changes to labeling.
147
Thus, tort law currently provides significant incentives for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide additional warnings
in the labeling of drugs. Recall that inadequate warnings are
the primary basis for pharmaceutical products liability
claims.'48 The best prophylactic available to a drug manu-
facturer with liability concerns is to include information about
all risks that emerge as promptly as possible. Thus, frequently
the manufacturer is the aggressor seeking labeling changes
with the FDA resisting such changes. 149 That is not to suggest
that tort incentives are always the predominant incentive.
Marketing concerns and competitive circumstances provide
countervailing incentives that in some contexts will be more
powerful. 5 °
145. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(3) (1996).
146. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 233-34 (explaining the exception
that allows manufacturers to strengthen warning labels, modify dosage, and delete
unsupported effectiveness claims without FDA approval); Sheila R. Shulman &
Marianne E. Ulcickas, Update on ADR Reporting Regulations: Products Liability
Implications, 3 J. CLINICAL REs. & DRUG DEV. 91, 97 (1989) (noting that manufac-
turers' failure to share new information, even before receiving FDA approval of the
labeling change, could result in the drug being misbranded).
147. See Cooper, supra note 14, at 236 (noting that manufacturers are reluctant
to make labeling changes without FDA approval); Viscusi et al., supra note 17, at
1441 n.8 (describing informal negotiations over drug labeling between FDA and
manufacturer).
148. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
149. See Viscusi et al., supra note 17, at 1468.
150. Again, the Bendectin experience is illuminating. The manufacturer negotiated
with the FDA over labeling changes that would identify an association found between
pyloric stenosis (a birth defect involving a blockage in the stomach) and maternal use
of the drug. The manufacturer's concern was to minimize the risks that would be
conveyed in the new labeling. This occurred against a background of severely declining
sales of the drug. See GREEN, supra note 26, at 183-84.
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What impact might an FDA compliance defense have on
manufacturer incentives to communicate risks discovered post-
marketing? This question becomes critical, and the answer
reveals a dramatic shifting of roles. With a regulatory
compliance defense available, manufacturers would no longer
have an incentive to seek labeling changes that would disclose
additional risks discovered in the post-marketing period. The
impetus for such changes would be left to the FDA. Here, the
compliance defense wipes out existing tort incentives, and we
would be wholly reliant on the FDA and its enforcement of
post-approval risk reporting regulation.15' The specter of
inadequate resources available to the FDA makes this role
reversal of significant concern. As one student of the FDA has
explained, "FDA action to change drug labeling and advertising
in response to new adverse information tends to be painfully
slow. Sometimes this is due to litigation. . . . Other delays have
been caused by organizational inefficiency and resources
shortages."'52 Moreover, unlike with the pre-approval situation
in which inaction by the FDA prevents a drug and its risks
from being available, there is no safety-enhancing temporizing
strategy available in the post-approval period.
Yet the apparent shield of a regulatory-compliance defense
in this post-approval period may be virtually illusory. The FDA
has regulations that require that drug labels be modified to
reflect newly emergent information relevant to use of the
drug."'53 If a compliance defense included compliance with those
regulations, the defense afforded a manufacturer by its pre-
approval regulatory compliance would be quite compromised
with respect to any post-approval information that identified
greater risks or less efficacy than was the case at the time of
FDA approval of the NDA. And, of course, once the compliance
defense shield is breached-here, by the inquiry about whether
the drug's labeling was modified in compliance with FDA
regulations regarding post-approval data-our ability to
contain the significant transaction costs imposed by the tort
system is imperiled.
151. See Gilhooley, supra note 143, at 1490 (arguing that drug companies will be
less likely to include warnings with reduced liability, leaving the FDA to warn
consumers).
152. Quirk, supra note 64, at 224.
153. The FDA requires that the labeling of a drug be modified "as soon as there
is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug; a causal
relationship need not have been proved." 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1996). In addition to
serious hazards, less significant adverse effects must be disclosed in the package
labeling. See id.
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The final aspect to consider is pharmaceutical market-
ing-media advertising and promotional calls on individual
physicians. One of the central tenets of the Restatement
(Third)'s treatment of pharmaceuticals is the essential role
played by physicians in making a considered assessment of the
risks and benefits of employing pharmaceuticals in the treat-
ment of a patient.'54 If physicians are to fulfill this role, at a
minimum they will have to have accurate and thorough infor-
mation about those risks and benefits. 5 5 The primary source
of that information, as discussed above, is the drug's labeling.
Pharmaceutical marketing is often another important source
of information for physicians,'56 however, and there is good
reason to believe that much pharmaceutical marketing is
detrimental to that goal. 5 7 Furthermore, the pharmaceutical
industry devotes considerable resources to marketing its
products: in written advertisements in medical journals, in
direct mail to physicians, in sponsoring educational and
scientific programs, increasingly in direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing, and through sales calls by company representatives on
physicians and others in the health care system who decide on
drug purchases. 5 ' Here, again, the FDA's limited ability to
enforce its own regulations that govern the post-approval
marketing process raises serious concerns about any
compliance defense, unless it were to include compliance with
post-approval regulatory requirements as well.'59
154. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 2, § 8 cmt. b (arguing that health care
professionals are uniquely able to advise ill patients); see also Henderson, supra note
42, at 481 & n.54 (concluding that the knowledge of the physician combined with full
manufacturer warnings and lack of third party effects warrants a denial of judicial
review on drug design).
155. This is a very questionable proposition in any case. See Quirk, supra note 64
passim.
156. See Drug Industry Antitrust Act: Hearing on S. 1552 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 181-84,
319 (1961) (discussing the impact of direct mail advertisements on a physician's choice
of which drug to prescribe).
157. See, e.g., Michael S. Wilkes et al., Pharmaceutical Advertisements in Leading
Medical Journals: Experts'Assessments, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 912,912 (1992).
158. Current estimates on marketing expenditures by the pharmaceutical industry
are in the range of $5 billion per year. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, FDA
Efforts to Control the Flow of Information at Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored
Medical Education Programs: A Regulatory Overdose, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1325,
1326 n.1 (1994).
159. For a discussion of drug products liability cases in which plaintiffs asserted
claims are based on the manufacturer's promotional efforts, see Janet Fairchild,
Annotation, Promotional Efforts Directed Toward Prescribing Physician as Affecting
Prescription Drug Manufacturer's Liability for Product-Caused Injury, 94 A.L.R. 3d
1080 (1979).
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In theory, the FDA regulates all written marketing and
advertising efforts by pharmaceutical manufacturers. The 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act transferred
jurisdiction over prescription drug advertising to the FDA. 6 '
Advertising that is "false and misleading" is proscribed.' 6 '
Although the Act contains no definition of advertising, the FDA
"has defined its authority in this area [labeling and advertis-
ing] to cover virtually any material issued by or sponsored by
a drug manufacturer."'62 Labeling includes material that
accompanies the drug, while advertising includes any other
efforts by the manufacturer to promote the drug.
The FDA has detailed regulations covering advertising and
defining "false and misleading" advertising, but the essential
concern is that any advertising should contain a "fair balance"
of information that would be relevant to a decision by a physi-
cian to prescribe. 6 3 But there is no mandatory pre-advertising
review, 16' and the FDA's most common response to advertising
that it believes violates its advertising regulations is to send
a letter to the manufacturer. This letter begins a negotiation
process between the FDA and the manufacturer.
In the FDA's oversight of advertising, again limited regu-
latory resources and the consequent need to order priorities
take their toll. There is good reason to believe that a substan-
160. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). For a history of legal and congressional
authority for the regulation of pharmaceuticals, see Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 158,
at 1334-43.
161. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1994).
162. David A. Kessler & Wayne L. Pines, The Federal Regulation of Prescription
Drug Advertising and Promotion, 264 JAMA 2409, 2409 (1990).
163. See id. at 2410. According to Kessler and Pines:
The agency's regulations list 33 ways an advertisement may be false or mislead-
ing. Most commonly, advertisements are judged false or misleading if they
selectively or inaccurately represent or report data, or make claims of superiori-
ty, based on less than adequate and well-controlled scientific studies; if they use
in vitro or animal data to suggest clinical significance when such significance
has not been demonstrated; or if they represent that the drug's indications are
broader than those approved by the FDA. In general, only information consistent
with the approved labeling can be used in advertising.
Id.
164. Recently, the FDA has requested voluntary advance review of promotional
copy. Some manufacturers have acceded and some have not. See id. No information
is currently available about how many of the advertisements submitted are reviewed,
the rigor of any reviews that are conducted, or whether this program has had an
impact on the accuracy of pharmaceutical advertising.
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tial amount of overclaiming and misleading information is
peddled in drug advertising. A 1992 study assessed the
accuracy of advertisements contained in medical journals. 165 It
employed panels of three physicians who were expert in the
field in which the drug was approved for use. The panels found
that at least twenty percent of the advertisements they re-
viewed were misleading about the drug's efficacy, encouraged
inappropriate use of the drug, or relied on inadequate studies
to justify use of the drug.166 Thirty percent were found to
contain inappropriate claims that the drug being promoted was
the drug of choice. 167 Forty percent lacked a balance between
information on efficacy and safety, 6 ' and fifty-seven percent
were determined to have failed to communicate adequately
adverse effects and contraindications. 6 9 For virtually every one
of the twenty-one categories, based on FDA regulations, that
the authors used to determine if advertising was false and
misleading, a substantial minority of advertisements failed.
170
Ninety-two percent of advertisements were not in compliance
with at least one of the FDA's criteria.' 71 Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, only forty-four percent of the reviewers felt that the
advertisement would lead to proper prescribing if the doctor
relied solely on the advertisement to make her prescribing
decision. 1
72
165. See Wilkes et al., supra note 157, at 916-17. The authors had hoped to
assemble panels of doctors who were independent of the industry by excluding all who
had received more than $300 in consulting, research, or honoraria from a pharmaceu-
tical company in the past two years. The authors report that "[clareful screening
revealed an insufficient number of physicians who met this criterion." Id. at 914. For
a critique of the methodology of this study, see Jacob Jacoby, Misleading Research on
the Subject of Misleading Advertising: The Wilkes et al. Investigation of Pharmaceuti-
cal Advertising in Leading Medical Journals, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 21 (1994), and
Paul H. Rubin, Are Pharmaceutical Ads Deceptive?, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7 (1994).
166. See Wilkes et al., supra note 157, at 916.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 915.
171. See id. at 916.
172. See id. at 917. It appears that the same problems identified in advertising
to physicians is occurring in the emerging direct-to-consumer advertising by the
pharmaceutical industry. See Drug Advertising: Is this Good Medicine?, CONSUMER
REP., June 1996, at 62 (noting that only 40% of advertisements evaluated contained
accurate information about the drug's efficacy and fairly explained the risks involved).
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The authors of the study concluded:
The finding of problems in a large proportion of pharma-
ceutical advertisements is troublesome, given research
suggesting that drug advertising serves as a major source
of information for practicing physicians. In an era where
several similar drugs are often available for a given condi-
tion many of which serve the same function, it is more
important than ever that physicians be provided with
accurate, truthful information.
Standards for honesty, accuracy, and balance in pharma-
ceutical advertising currently exist in the form of FDA
regulations, but these regulations appear to go unheeded. 173
Once again, the choice is between removing the apparently
inadequate incentives provided by the tort system to keep
advertising truthful or to create yet another hole in a regula-
tory compliance defense that would require assessments of
whether drug advertising met the FDA's "false and misleading"
standards, 174 and, if not, whether the violation of the FDA's
advertising regulations can be linked causally to the plaintiffs
injury. That inquiry will require assessing what the prescribing
physician would have done had accurate information been
provided in the manufacturer's advertising and might entail
far longer causal chains, such as the reason why a group
practice or other physician community preferred one drug
therapy over other available treatments. 75
Another important marketing activity is the promotional
process that goes on between pharmaceutical companies'
agents, known as detailers, and physicians. 76 The FDA's legal
173. Wilkes et al., supra note 157, at 918.
174. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(5)-(7) (1996) (setting forth the FDA's detailed standards
for advertisements that are "false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading").
175. See supra notes 106-05 and accompanying text.
176. See Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate
the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 309, 310-12 (1992) (explaining detailer's function and importance in the
drug industry); Twilight of U.S. Detail Forces?, SCRIP, Dec. 13, 1991, at 16 (estimating
that as many as 50,000 detailers are employed by the pharmaceutical industry). For
an explanation by a former detailer of the conflicting roles of marketing the employer's
products and providing accurate information to physicians, see Comment, The
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authority to regulate these oral communications is quite
controversial. 177 Equally importantly, the FDA's practical
ability to monitor these activities is virtually nil.178 If there is
industry exaggeration and hyping in media advertising, one
suspects that it is far greater in the personal interactions
between marketing agent and physician that are standard
practice in the pharmaceutical field.17 Overpromotion (in-
cluding promoting off-label uses) claims based on marketing
efforts by pharmaceutical representatives might furnish an
attractive alternative theory for plaintiffs to pursue if a com-
pliance defense removes other avenues.' Such claims might
not be encompassed within a regulatory compliance defense,
if, as many industry advocates claim,' 8' the FDA is without
authority to regulate oral communications by salespeople, a
matter that, presumably, would have to be decided in an
overpromotion case. If the FDA does have regulatory authority
and if its advertising regulations are applicable to oral market-
ing efforts, the questions about compliance with FDA standards
discussed above for written advertising would necessarily
arise.18
2
CONCLUSION
I draw several conclusions from this analysis of a regulatory
standards defense, especially in the context of prescription
drugs. First, and most evidently, an FDA regulatory
compliance defense is not nearly as neat nor as clean a reform
Ubiquitous Detailman: An Inquiry Into His Functions and Activities and the Law
Relating to Them, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 185-92 (1973).
177. See Noah, supra note 176, at 315-16; Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 158, at
1344-45.
178. See Noah, supra note 176, at 310 & n.6.
179. See, e.g., Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995); see also
ANGELL, supra note 115, at 59 (quoting"obviously duplicitous" memorandum to detail
persons explaining how to conceal from physicians tendency of new implants to leak
fluid); Noah, supra note 176 passim (examining the unique difficulties of regulating
oral promotion).
180. See, e.g., Benedi, 66 F.3d at 1389 (describing how a manufacturer instructed
detail persons not to discuss with physicians a study identifying the risk of adverse
reactions when their drug was combined with alcohol drinking).
181. See Kessler & Pines, supra note 162, at 2411.
182. See Kessler & Pines, supra note 162, at 2411 ("Until further judicial decisions
or congressional action clarifies the FDA's specific authority in the area of promotion,
the FDA will continue to assert broad jurisdiction.").
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as many supporters may have envisioned. Although it might
be reasonable to attempt some greater protection for prescrip-
tion drugs based on regulatory compliance-for those risks for
which post-approval information has not revealed different
risks from those known at the time of FDA approval, or per-
haps for punitive damages-complete immunity from suit
based on FDA approval or even compliance with FDA regula-
tions seems ill-advised.
Even a limited FDA regulatory compliance defense is not
unproblematic. In the case of severe drug-related injuries,
rather than avoiding litigation, such a defense is likely to shift
the area of inquiry in current pharmaceutical litigation to other
questions. These will include compliance by the manufacturer
with FDA requirements during the IND process, the existence
of newly emerged information that the FDA did not consider
when approving the labeling and marketing and promotional
efforts by the manufacturer that may be in violation of FDA
requirements. The extensiveness of FDA regulations and the
complexity of the pre-marketing testing process could trans-
form that inquiry into a Serbian bog that would consume
substantial resources.
At the same time, increasing the barriers to suit should deter
some cases from being brought. Yet the cases that are likely
to be squeezed out of the tort system may very well be merito-
rious,183 albeit ones involving minor or modest injuries that do
not affect a large number of individuals.'84 Increasing the
threshold (and thereby the resources) required to bring a suit
will enhance the trend toward high stakes, high damages,
multiple claimant drug litigation, the only type in which the
recoverable damages will be sufficient to support the costs of
investigation and discovery regarding the question of regulato-
ry compliance. The advantages of aggregation in pooling
resources and information or even more informal information
exchanges among plaintiffs' attorneys are simply not available
for the relatively infrequent adverse effect. 185
183. By "meritorious" I mean cases that under the prevailing legal standard with
a regulatory compliance defense should nevertheless result in ajudgment for plaintiff.
184. The availability of punitive damages in the event of manufacturer noncompli-
ance would modify this effect.
185. The claims I have made about the impact of a regulatory approval defense
should be recognized as nothing more than armchair hypotheses. The proof is in the
testing, and there are a number of states that have now adopted some form of a
regulatory compliance defense. Those states provide an opportunity for empirical
research of the effect of a compliance defense on pharmaceutical litigation. The
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Compromising on a regulatory compliance defense by limit-
ing it to punitive damages has much appeal. There is great
consternation about punitive damages in the pharmaceutical
industry. Plaintiffs still could recover compensatory damages
without proof of regulatory noncompliance, but might be
deterred from pursuing punitive damages by the large inves-
tigation costs. And if a defendant does comply with FDA
regulations, why should it be subject to punitive damages?
This compromise, however, has a serious disadvantage. With-
out providing any screening of a case, courts and juries will
have to make assessments of causation and the adequacy of
warnings in the traditional manner. Yet the substantial
administrative costs entailed in determining regulatory com-
pliance also will be incurred in those cases in which plaintiffs
do decide to pursue claims for punitive damages. Despite the
superficial appeal, this compromise adopts undesirable as-
pects of two different worlds. Given that punitive damages are
awarded infrequently in products liability cases, 86 providing
a regulatory compliance defense for punitive damages may
entail employing a mountain to root out a molehill. There is
also good reason to believe that much of the extreme fear of
punitive damages is no more than that-exaggerated fear
among manufacturers about the possibility of being tagged
with a large punitive damage award-rather than based on
statutes are relatively recent, and given the low incidence of pharmaceutical products
cases, it may be difficult to find an adequate sample. Moreover, while measuring the
effect of a compliance defense on litigation may be realistic, I am dubious about the
possibility of assessing the impact of any defense, even one on a federal level, on the
pharmaceutical industry. That, after all, is the point of adopting such a reform.
186. Study after study reaches the conclusion that punitive damages are rare in
personal injury and products liability litigation. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 302-07 (1987); MARK PETERSON
ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987); MICHAEL RUSTAD,
DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A
QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS 26 & 48-49 nn.3-5 (1991); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CIVIL JUSTICE STUDY OF STATE COURTS,
1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 6-9 (1995); Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1, 28-43 (1990); Edward Felsenthal, Punitive-Damage Awards Found to be Generally
Modest and Rare, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at B4; Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1254-62 (1992); cf GARBER, supra note 8, at 48 n.60 (citing
an amicus brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court by the Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers Association and the American Medical Association that found an increase in trial
awards of punitive damages from six awards from 1970 to 1979, to 17 from 1980 to
1984, to 35 from 1985 to 1988).
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objective data or experience. 8 7 Enacting reform statutes that
reflect those distorted perceptions may provide additional
succor for them.
Of course, the question of the impact of a regulatory com-
pliance defense on the pharmaceutical industry in terms of
enhancing innovation and facilitating the introduction of new
drugs is one that remains to be explored. That is a far more
difficult endeavor, and I leave the task to others, recognizing,
however, that the answer is an important variable in balanc-
ing the concerns expressed in this Article about the adverse
impact of a compliance defense.
Perhaps even the initial premise of this Article is incorrect.
Given the difficulties identified in implementing a regulatory
compliance defense for pharmaceutical drugs, it may be that
this is not the strongest arena for a compliance defense. It
may be that a very clear and specific regulatory standard,
developed in an open rulemaking process, would provide a
more attractive candidate for such a defense.' I leave that
question to others, because, as I hope this excursion through
the FDA and its regulation of pharmaceuticals will persuade
the reader, any effort to make changes to section 7 of the
Restatement (Third) requires consideration of the specific
regulatory scheme and the industry involved.'89 The devil is
truly in the details, which must be examined carefully if
reform of the current balance between tort and regulation is
to be attempted.
187. See GARBER, supra note 8, at 184-85, 196; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1360;
Viscusi et al., supra note 17, at 1476-77 & n.141.
188. I am grateful to Professor Lars Noah for this suggestion.
189. Cf GARBER, supra note 8, at 171-72 ("The policy implications here cannot be
presumed to apply to other industries: Our conclusions stem from aspects of the
market, technological, regulatory, and legal environments of the pharmaceutical and
medical device industries that do not characterize U.S. industry at large.").
